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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE BIAS, EXAMINER EXPERIENCE, AND
STIMULUS MATERIAL ON FORENSIC EVIDENCE ANALYSIS
by
Michelle M. Pena
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Nadja Schreiber Compo, Major Professor
Forensic examiners have come under scrutiny in recent years because of high
profile exoneration cases that have highlighted the negative impact contextual bias can
have on investigations including forensic evidence analyses. This has led to several
proposed solutions to reduce the effects of bias including blind testing and redacting taskirrelevant information. However, practitioners have not been receptive to such
recommendations because of the limitations found in past research, such as the use of
untrained undergraduate students to examine complex pieces of forensic evidence (e.g.,
fingerprints). The current study thus had the following aims: (a) examine the effect of
contextual bias on examiners’ evaluation of forensic evidence by varying the amount of
pre-comparison information available to participants, (b) compare novice and expert
examiners’ performance when conducting forensic analyses and their vulnerabilities to
contextual bias, and (c) investigate the effect of contextual bias on examiners’ evaluation
of different types of forensic evidence. Expert forensic examiners and novice
undergraduate students were recruited and provided with a lab analysis request form that
either contained all case summary details about a mock crime, no case summary details
v

about the crime (i.e., blind testing) or had task-irrelevant case summary details redacted.
Participants were asked to compare matching and non-matching fingerprint and footwear
impression evidence. Results suggest no effect of blinding examiners from case
information or redacting task-irrelevant information on examiners’ decisions. Findings
also suggest that both examiner experience and the type of forensic evidence analyzed
can have a significant effect on examiners’ judgments. Expert examiners were
significantly more accurate than novices. However, expert examiners were only
significantly more accurate and better able to discriminate between matching and nonmatching pairs of evidence when analyzing fingerprint evidence and not footwear
impression evidence. These findings suggest caution when using forensic stimuli with
novice samples to investigate cognitive bias in forensic examination. Finally, the present
study suggest that the proposed blinding and redaction procedures require additional
research including expert examiners and a spectrum of forensic stimulus material to yield
measurable effects of cognitive bias.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Forensic sciences, including DNA and fingerprint analyses, were once believed to
be error-free and consist of objective and purely scientific procedures, thus being
regularly admitted as evidence at trial (Mnookin et al., 2011). Unfortunately, various
high-profile cases, such as that of Brandon Mayfield (i.e., Madrid Bomber case), have
brought forensic sciences under scrutiny in recent years as they highlight the subjective
nature of such analyses and the subsequent consequences of human error. Along with
these high-profile cases, analyses of hundreds of cases by the Innocence Project suggest
that a large number of DNA exonerations are due, at least in part, to improper analysis or
use of forensic evidence, casting doubt on the reliability of forensic sciences (Innocence
Project, 2017).
In recent years, researchers have begun to explore the potential factors that may
lead forensic examiners to make such consequential errors. Specifically, a significant
amount of research has examined how cognitive biases can affect the analysis of forensic
evidence including DNA samples, fingerprints, handwriting samples, and footwear
impressions (Dror & Hampikian, 2011; Dror, Peron, Hind, & Charlton, 2005; Kerstholt,
Paashuis & Sjerps, 2007; Kukucka & Kassin, 2014). Much of this research suggests that
having contextual information indicating that two forensic evidence samples came from
the same person (e.g., suspect confessed to the crime) can increase the likelihood that an
examiner will arrive at the same conclusion (e.g., fingerprint found at the crime scene
matches suspect’s fingerprint), regardless of whether or not the samples did originate
from the same person (Dror, Charlton, & Peron, 2006; Kukucka & Kassin, 2014).
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Together, wrongful conviction cases and research on the effect of cognitive bias
on forensic evidence analyses have led to the development of various solutions aimed at
reducing these negative effects of bias. Some of these recommendations include
implementing blind testing, using evidence lineups, and hiring case managers to redact
any task-irrelevant information from lab analysis request forms (LARs) – a method often
suggested as part of the linear sequential unmasking procedure (Edmond et al., 2016;
Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013; Krane et al., 2008; Mattijssen, Kerkoff, Berger, Dror &
Stoel, 2016; Saks, Risinger, Rosenthal, & Thompson, 2003). However, some of the
recommendations put forth by researchers, such as using the linear sequential unmasking
procedure, which are believed to reduce bias, have not been experimentally tested in
forensic contexts.
In addition, practitioners are often hesitant to incorporate recommendations that
stem from research testing inexperienced examiners (often undergraduate students) who
have no training in analyzing complex forensic evidence such as fingerprints. The present
study thus aims to address the gap in the literature and the concerns voiced by forensic
examiners (e.g., Butt, 2013) by directly comparing the use of blind versus redaction
procedures on the analysis of different types of forensic evidence (i.e., fingerprints and
footwear impressions) and the role examiner experience plays in explaining the
relationship between cognitive bias and examiners’ judgments.
Cognitive Bias
Social and cognitive scientists often use the term cognitive bias to describe a
variety of different biases in human cognition and behavior. For instance, confirmation
bias, contextual bias, expectancy effects, observer effects, tunnel vision, and belief
2

perseverance are often used interchangeably within the literature. Although the exact
definitions for each of these terms vary to some degree, they all describe a variation of
cognitive bias. In its broadest sense, cognitive bias describes how individuals’ prior
beliefs and preconceptions can bias their subsequent interpretation of information in the
direction of those expectations (Kassin et al., 2013; Nickerson, 1998; Rosenthal, 1994;
Rosenthal & Fode, 1963). Cognitive biases are processes that occur automatically
without the individuals’ awareness (Kunda, 1990). As such, individuals are not
purposefully seeking out information or behaving in ways that support their prior beliefs
nor are they deliberately choosing to ignore information that does not fit with their
hypothesis (Ask & Granhag, 2005; Nickerson, 1998).
Although cognitive bias occurs without conscious awareness, years of research
have consistently shown that individuals’ expectations can produce dramatic behavioral
consequences. For example, in one of the first studies examining bias, conducted by
Rosenthal and Rubin (1978), grade-school teachers were arbitrarily told that some of
their students had scored above average on an intelligence test and were thus expected to
show a significant growth intellectually. Results demonstrated that students who were
expected to produce this greater intellectual growth did in fact do so compared to those
students who were not designated “high-scoring.” Similarly, Snyder and Swann (1978)
examined how individuals’ prior beliefs about another individual could affect how they
behaved and interacted with the other individual. The researchers led participants to
believe that they would be interviewing a person who was either an extrovert or an
introvert. Results revealed that interviewers selected questions and elicited responses that
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were consistent with their expectations regarding the interviewee’s personality. The
pattern of results was true regardless of whether interviewers’ expectations were correct.
Cognitive bias has not only been shown to affect individuals’ overt behaviors, but
also their perceptions of presented stimuli. For example, one of the classic studies
conducted by Brunner and Potter (1964) shows how creating an initial hypothesis
regarding ambiguous material affects how one perceives the same material as it becomes
less ambiguous. Specifically, they presented participants with images of objects that were
initially out of focus and were then shown images of these same objects as they were
slowly brought into focus. They found that individuals’ initial beliefs of what they
believed the object was in the first blurred image interfered with its recognition later on,
when the same image became less blurry.
In another study conducted by Bressan and Dan Martello (2002), participants
were asked to rate the similarity between two faces and were told either a truthful or
deceitful statement regarding the degree to which the two faces were related. Participants
who had been told that the two faces were related rated the faces as more similar than
participants who had been led to believe that the faces were unrelated regardless of
whether the faces were truly related or not. In other words, what participants were told
and thus their prior beliefs about the relatedness of the faces was a stronger predictor of
how similar they rated the faces than the actual relatedness of the faces. Both of these
studies demonstrate how cognitive biases, which are often considered to be mental
shortcuts that ultimately simplify human decision making, can lead to errors in how one
perceives subsequent stimuli and thus decisions made regarding such stimuli.
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Cognitive Bias in Legal Contexts
Research on cognitive bias has expanded beyond basic research lab paradigms
into applied legal contexts, with similar results (Cantlon, Payne, & Erbaugh, 1996; Hasel
& Kassin, 2009; Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003). Specifically, researchers have
examined the effects of cognitive bias in witness and suspect interviewing contexts as
well as within lineup procedures and eyewitness identifications. Regardless of the legal
context in which cognitive bias has been examined, researchers continue to find support
for its effect on human behavior and decision-making. For example, Kassin, Goldstein
and Savitsky (2003), investigated how manipulating interrogators’ a priori expectations
of a suspect’s guilt affected the types of questions interrogators asked and the different
tactics used when interviewing the suspect. Specifically, interrogators were led to believe
that the person they would be interviewing was either likely to be guilty or likely to be
innocent and were informed that either 80% of the suspects in the study committed the
crime (guilty expectation condition) or that only 20% committed the crime (innocent
expectation condition). Results suggested that pre-interview expectations of guilt led to
changes in an interrogator’s behavior such that those in the guilty expectation condition
used more guilt-presumptive questions and interrogation tactics (e.g., promises of
leniency, presentation of false evidence) than participants in the innocent expectation
condition.
Other studies examining the effect of pre-interview information have also found
an effect on witness recall and victim disclosures (Cantlon et al., 1996; Rivard, Pena, &
Schreiber Compo, 2015). For example, Rivard and colleagues (2015) conducted a study
examining the effect of cognitive bias in adult witness interviewing contexts. Student5

interviewers were provided either with correct, incorrect, or no information (i.e., blind
interviewers) about a crime prior to interviewing student-witnesses who had watched said
mock-crime. They found that witnesses recalled more correct details when interviewed
by blind interviewers than by correctly informed interviewers. Taken together, findings
across different legal interviewing contexts suggest that having pre-interview information
may yield behavior that is detrimental to interviewers’ questioning strategies and the
quality and quantity of information elicited from witnesses.
Within the eyewitness literature, there is also evidence to suggest that having
information regarding the suspect’s guilt can affect eyewitness identification decisions.
Hasel and Kassin (2009) exposed participants to a staged theft and a week later asked
them to make an identification from a lineup that did not include the perpetrator.
Participants were then told that a certain lineup member had confessed to the crime
before being provided with the opportunity to change their original identification
decision. They found that more than half of the participants who had selected a lineup
member, but were later informed that it had been a different lineup member who
confessed to the crime, changed their initial identification. In fact, 50% of those
participants who changed their initial identification, selected the lineup member who
allegedly confessed. Here too, research suggests that having prior beliefs about an
individuals’ guilt can have direct consequences on a witness’ decision-making process as
well as their perceptions of information presented to them.
Relatedly, other studies examining the effects of cognitive bias in eyewitness
identification contexts have found that having information regarding a suspect’s location
in the lineup can affect lineup administrators’ verbal and nonverbal behaviors
6

(Greathouse & Kovera, 2009). That is, administrators who are aware of the suspect’s
location in a lineup may inadvertently leak cues of the specific location to the witness,
which in turn can influence eyewitness decisions (Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Haw &
Fisher, 2004). It has therefore been recommended that lineups be administered in a
double-blind fashion, with the lineup administrator “blind” to who the suspect is (IACP,
2010). Overall, findings across various legal contexts mirror those found in initial studies
examining the effects of cognitive bias, such that individuals’ expectations can affect
how they behave and interpret subsequent information.
Cognitive Bias in Forensic Contexts
More recently research on cognitive bias has been extended to the domain of
forensic sciences. As a result of high-profile cases highlighting the negative
consequences of cognitive bias on forensic examiners’ decision-making, research has
more directly examined the intricacies of how and when cognitive bias can affect the
analysis of forensic evidence. Similar to past research on the effects of cognitive bias in
other legal contexts (e.g., suspect interviewing, eyewitness identifications), research in
the forensic domain suggests that individuals assessing forensic evidence are not immune
to the effects of cognitive bias (Dror & Cole, 2010; Dror & Rosenthal, 2008). Kassin,
Dror, and Kukucka (2013) coined the term forensic confirmation bias to describe “the
class of effect through which an individual’s preexisting beliefs, expectations, motives,
and situation context influence the collection, perception, and interpretation of evidence
during the course of a criminal case” (p. 45). Similarly, the term contextual bias is often
used in research examining the effects of bias in forensic sciences to refer to the specific
effect of having extraneous information about the case (e.g., suspect’s ethnicity,
7

additional incriminating evidence) on examiners’ evaluations of forensic evidence
(Edmond, Tangen, Searston, & Dror, 2015; Lange, Thomas, Dana, & Dawes, 2011).
Research has examined the effect of contextual bias across a number of forensic
domains including fingerprints, handwriting samples, shoeprints, bullets, auditory
samples, and polygraph results (Dror et al., 2005; Elaad, Ginton, & Shakhar, 1994;
Kerstholt, Paashuis, & Sjerps, 2007; Kerstholt et al., 2010; Kukucka & Kassin, 2014;
Lange et al., 2011). Even DNA testing, which is often considered to be the “goldstandard” of forensic evidence, has been demonstrated to fall prey to cognitive bias (Dror
& Hampikian, 2011; Lynch, 2003), as all forensic domains require, to some extent, an
individual’s subjective opinion to determine whether two pieces of evidence are similar
enough to be considered a match regardless of the type of stimulus material.
Taken together, findings across domains suggest that individuals’ decisions
regarding the extent to which two stimuli/pieces of evidence derive from the same source
(i.e., are matches) can be influenced by outside information about the crime, the suspect,
or other available evidence. Research has also begun to expand beyond simply examining
what type of contextual information can bias examiners’ analyses by investigating what
specific moderating factors, if any, can influence the strength of the cognitive bias effect.
For example, Dror and colleagues (2005) conducted a study examining the effects of
emotional contextual case information and stimuli ambiguity on examiners’ interpretation
of fingerprint evidence. Students were presented with numerous pairs of fingerprints that
varied in level of ambiguity (i.e., ambiguous versus unambiguous). Before deciding
whether each pair of prints were matches or non-matches, participants were presented
with background information and photographs of the crime (i.e., contextual information).
8

The background information for each pair of prints varied in the emotional state it
invoked; participants were provided with less serious, low-in-emotion background
information about the crime (e.g., a bicycle theft) or with serious, high-in-emotion
background information (e.g., a murder). Participants were also provided with crime
scene pictures consistent with their condition; the low emotional state participants viewed
pictures of the stolen items whereas those in the high emotional state condition were
presented with pictures of victims who had been badly hurt or killed. They found that
participants in the high emotional state condition were more likely to state that two
fingerprints were a match (regardless of whether or not they were indeed a match)
compared to those in the low emotional state. However, the effect was only found for
participants who were given ambiguous fingerprints and not for those who were given
clear fingerprints. This suggests that although cognitive bias may be present, other
variables such as evidence ambiguity, can influence the relationship between contextual
bias and examiner accuracy.
Similarly, Kukucka and Kassin (2014) conducted a study to examine whether the
similarity between two pieces of evidence could influence the degree to which having
contextual information about a suspect could affect examiners’ decisions about the
evidence. Participants were presented with a case in which an individual had robbed a
bank and had been brought in for questioning. They then provided participants with
evidence consisting of a handwritten note the perpetrator had given the bank teller
demanding the money and a Miranda waiver the suspect in custody had signed. Before
participants were asked to compare the two handwriting samples and decide whether they
were a match or a non-match, participants were presented with information regarding the
9

innocence of the suspect. While some participants were told that the suspect had
confessed during a prior interview, other participants were told that the suspect had
maintained his innocence throughout the entire interview. The similarity between the two
handwriting samples was also manipulated; samples were either categorized as very
similar or not similar to one another. The effect of bias was hypothesized to have a
stronger impact when participants were presented with a pair of highly similar nonmatching handwriting samples (a more difficult comparison) compared to less similar
non-matching handwriting samples. Although results suggested an effect of cognitive
bias, such that participants who had been told the suspect confessed were more likely to
incorrectly judge the non-matching handwriting samples as matching, handwriting
similarity did not moderate the effect cognitive bias had on participants’ analyses of the
handwriting samples. The lack of the moderating effect suggests that regardless of
whether it was a “clear” non-match decision (i.e., handwriting samples were less similar
to one another) or not, participants were just as likely to erroneously state the samples
were a match, which differs from Dror and colleagues’ (2005) findings where stimulus
ambiguity did have a moderating effect on examiners’ judgments.
It is also important to note that while some studies find an effect of cognitive bias
on forensic analyses, others fail to demonstrate the effect at all (Dror & Cole, 2010;
Kerstholt et al., 2007; Kerstholt et al., 2010). For example, Kerstholt and colleagues
(2007) examined the effects of expectation and evidence complexity on trained police
officers’ footwear impression examinations. Participants were presented with either
neutral or guilt-presumptive information regarding the background of the case before
being presented with four footwear impressions, two of which were simple and two of
10

which were considered complex. Kerstholt and colleagues (2007) found no main effect of
expectation such that the guilt-presumptive information about the suspect given to
participants did not alter how much evidentiary value was assigned to each footwear
impression. These findings are in direct contrast to prior research suggesting that case
details can affect individuals’ judgment and perception of evidence (Dror et al., 2005).
Differences in results across studies may be caused by differences in outcome
measures, cognitive bias manipulations, study procedures, and participant samples used.
For example, while some studies may provide participants with both matching and nonmatching pieces of evidence, others may simply present non-matching prints or
matching-prints. The problem lies in that one study may only measure the likelihood of
participants making incorrect “match” decisions, while another study may only measure
the likelihood of making incorrect “non-match” decisions; two different decisions, which
arguably use different decision-making criterion. Similarly, some studies may ask
participants to make a match/non-match judgment while others may simply ask them to
rate how valuable the piece of evidence is. Again, differences in outcome measures make
it difficult to pinpoint under what circumstances cognitive bias may be particularly
harmful to individuals’ analyses of forensic evidence. In addition, a common limitation
found in past research examining the effect of cognitive bias on forensic analyses is the
lack of information provided regarding the methods used to categorize their stimuli as
similar/not similar, ambiguous/unambiguous, or complex/non-complex. Without such
information on how and if evidence materials were piloted, it is almost impossible to
compare the effects of such moderating factors, likely further accounting for differences
across studies.
11

Dangers of Cognitive Bias in Forensic Sciences
Despite these inconsistencies and a lack of empirical research disentangling
possible reasons for them, researchers generally agree that the potential dangers of
cognitive bias in forensic sciences need to be addressed, and have proposed reforms
(Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013; National Academy of Sciences, 2009). One of the first
calls for reform was made by the National Academy of Science, which published a report
critiquing various forensic disciplines (e.g., firearms, handwriting, fingerprints) for their
lack of standardization and the risk of contextual bias affecting analyses (National
Academy of Sciences, 2009). The report strongly urged the discipline of forensic science
to work together with cognitive psychologists to address the issues related to cognitive
bias in the forensic science disciplines.
Many researchers have also argued that the dangers of cognitive bias go beyond
simply affecting forensic examiners in the lab and have the potential to spill over to other
pieces of evidence and other stages of the investigation, thus creating a bias snowball
effect (Charman, Kavetski, & Mueller, 2017; Dror, Morgan, Rando, & Nakhaeizadeh,
2017). The bias snowball effect explains how the effect of bias can increase as additional
pieces of irrelevant information from different sources are integrated, influencing one
another. For example, a forensic examiner may be influenced by information regarding a
suspect’s confession, which in turn affects how the examiner perceives a pair of
fingerprints, which can then subsequently affect an eyewitness’ identification if they are
made aware of the confession information. Thus, these “independent” pieces of evidence
are no longer independent of one another and instead lead to “corroboration inflation”
(Kassin, 2012), where an illusion of false support is produced.
12

Furthermore, a theoretical model has been proposed to better explain how
cognitive bias affects the integration of evidence and how it affects the investigation of a
crime as a whole, making it especially problematic (Charman, 2013). The cognitive
coherence approach argues that research must move beyond simply understanding how
one piece of evidence (e.g., confession) influences the evaluation of another piece of
evidence (e.g., eyewitness identification), and highlights how the evaluation of evidence
affects greater evolving conclusions that are formed by the investigative team (i.e.,
whether the suspect is guilty or not guilty). It also emphasizes the bidirectionality of these
effects such that the evaluation of one piece of evidence affects the emerging conclusion,
and this conclusion in turn can affect the evaluation of other evidence (Charman, 2013;
Dror et al., 2017).
Overall, a significant amount of research has focused on factors that can bias
forensic examiners such as knowing that the suspect confessed (Kukucka & Kassin,
2014), that the evidence is part of a high-profile case (Schiffer & Champod, 2007) or
knowing the conclusions of a previous examiner (Dror, Charlton, & Peron, 2006).
Regardless of the context, findings have often led researchers to warn practitioners
against the potential dangers that stem from the cross-contamination of evidentiary
information when examiners are informed of other, forensic or non-forensic pieces of
information.
Proposed Solutions
Previous work examining the possible factors that can make examiners
particularly susceptible to bias has led researchers to propose and advocate for procedural
changes in forensic laboratories that minimize the effects of cognitive bias (see Kassin,
13

Dror, Kukucka, 2013). For example, researchers have proposed using the following, (1)
blind testing, (2) evidence lineups, and (3) contextual information management
procedures (Cole, 2013; Edmond et al., 2016; Kassin et al., 2013; Mattijssen et al., 2016;
Risinger, Saks, Thompson, & Rosenthal, 2002; Saks et al., 2003; Thompson, 2011).
Blind testing. Blind testing is one of the most recommended and used methods in
both the biomedical field (Kaptchuk, 1998) and in psychological research (Rosenthal,
1966), rendering both scientists and researchers unaware of the conditions participants
have been assigned to and of study hypotheses, which both have the potential to provide
biasing information. Similarly, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology (2016) has noted the importance of blinding forensic examiners from
extraneous and potentially biasing information. In addition to the recent body of work on
cognitive bias in forensic sciences, these recommendations are largely influenced by the
years of research examining the effect of cognitive bias on individuals’ decision-making
(Nickerson, 1998; Rosenthal & Fode, 1963).
Unfortunately, there is a large discrepancy between how strongly researchers
advocate for the use of blind testing in forensic sciences and the amount of research that
has actually tested this method in forensically-relevant domains. That is, only a few
studies have directly examined how keeping examiners blind to extraneous information
about a case influences their decisions. The majority of studies manipulate participants’
expectations regarding a piece of evidence by presenting some participants with
incriminating evidence (e.g., suspect confessed) or potentially biasing case information
(e.g., high profile case) and other participants with “neutral” information (e.g., suspect
maintained his innocence throughout entire interview, low-profile case; Kukucka &
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Kassin, 2014; Schiffer & Champod, 2007). However, presenting participants with
“neutral” information is not a true test of blind testing, which would require participants
to receive no information (or at least no extraneous information) about the case.
Those few studies that have directly tested a bona fide blind testing manipulation
(i.e., examiners were not provided with any information about the case and were solely
given pieces of evidence to analyze) have yielded mixed results regarding a possible
advantage of using blind testing (Lange et al., 2011; Langenburg, Champod, &
Wertheim, 2009). For example, Langenburg and colleagues (2009) assigned participants
who were either experts or trained students who had taken a forensic fingerprint analyses
training course to either a high bias, low bias, or no context condition. Participants in the
no context condition were not provided with any information about the case and were
simply asked to make a judgment regarding the fingerprints. Participants in the high and
low bias group were provided with information regarding a prior examiner’s decision.
Participants in the no context condition made a similar number of errors when judging the
fingerprints compared to those in the high and low bias groups. However, in a different
study conducted by Lange and colleagues (2011), a different finding emerged.
Participants listened to and transcribed degraded pieces of audio and were either told that
the audio they would be listening to was from a suspect interview or were not given any
information (i.e., blind condition). They found that participants who listened to
significantly degraded audio clips and were told it was a suspect interview were 7.23
times more likely to misinterpret the audio than those in the blind condition suggesting
that blind testing can be used to increase accuracy.
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Although past research on the effects of blind testing in other areas support the
notion for blind testing in forensic contexts and the intuitively sensible notion that
providing forensic examiners with no information about the crime will prevent bias or at
least the notion of bias, research has yet to provide results on this issue that are directly
relevant to forensic sciences in general and forensic examiners in particular. The present
study thus aims to address the gap in the literature and provide a direct examination of
blind testing procedures within a forensically-relevant context.
Evidence lineups. Another novel and innovative solution that has been proposed
by researchers to reduce the effect of cognitive bias on forensic examinations is the use of
a filler-control method, also known as evidence lineups (Kassin et al., 2013; Saks et al.,
2003; Wells, Wilford, & Smalarz, 2013). Evidence lineups are likened to photo lineup
identification procedures in principle as they present examiners with at least three
samples of evidence – the crime scene sample, the suspect sample, and an innocent filler
sample(s). The suspect sample and the filler sample are presented so that the examiner is
unaware of which sample belongs to the suspect and which one belongs to the filler (Saks
et al., 2003). Thus, it is similar to an eyewitness lineup such that the suspect sample is
present among “foils.” Current examination of evidence in forensic labs are more similar
to eyewitness “show-ups,” instead of ‘lineups,” which imply that the correct suspect
sample is present (i.e., a match). Evidence lineups on the other hand are aimed at
decreasing cognitive bias such that even if examiners are exposed to contextual
information (e.g., suspect confessed), they still do not know which sample came from the
suspect and which came from the fillers (Wells et al., 2013).
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Research examining evidence lineup procedures suggest that it can increase the
accuracy of examiners’ judgments (Miller, 1987; Quigley-Mcbride, 2017). For example,
in a study conducted by Miller (1987), student participants who were enrolled in a crime
laboratory college course were asked to compare hair samples for four different criminal
investigations. All participants were given a hair sample that had been recovered from
each of the four different crime scenes and were given background case information.
However, for two of the four cases, participants were given only one other suspect hair
sample to compare to. For the remaining two cases, participants were asked to make the
comparison using an evidence lineup where they were presented with five suspect-known
hair samples for each case. Examiners made significantly more incorrect judgments when
using the standard procedure (comparing evidence found at the crime scene to only one
suspect sample) compared to when using the evidence lineup. Although this initial study
highlights the ability of evidence lineups to increase examiners’ accuracy, it did not
manipulate the presence of contextual bias.
Quigley-McBride (2017), expanded upon the study conducted by Miller (1987)
by examining whether using an evidence lineup could successfully eliminate the effect of
cognitive bias. Undergraduate student participants were assigned to assess a set of
fingerprints using either a standard procedure (comparing one crime scene fingerprint
with one suspect fingerprint) or an evidence lineup procedure (comparing one crime
scene fingerprint with six suspect fingerprints). Some participants received a police report
containing additional evidence that strongly incriminated the suspect (i.e., DNA found
under witness’ fingernails matched suspect’s DNA) while other participants did not
receive additional incriminating evidence. The use of an evidence lineup procedure was
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found to successfully decrease the effect of biasing information. Albeit promising, to date
the Quigley-McBride (2017) study is the only empirical test of whether evidence lineups
may be useful in protecting forensic examiners from the biasing effects of having
contextual case information. As the Quigley-McBride (2017) study included only novice,
inexperienced examiners, it is of crucial importance that future research examining the
effects of evidence lineups include expert examiners and other stimuli in addition to hair
samples and fingerprints. Furthermore, filler selection criteria and processes need to be
transparent and clearly delineated to ensure that forensic experts agree with the
methodology of these studies. This transparency will not only allow us to systematically
investigate the importance of training/expertise and type of stimuli/evidence, but also
contribute more directly to the translation of such research for forensic experts.
Contextual information management procedures. One of the recently proposed
solutions for eliminating cognitive bias in forensic analyses is the use of contextual
information management procedures (Kassin et al., 2013; Edmond et al., 2016; Cole,
2013; Mattijssen, et al., 2016; Risinger et al., 2002; Thompson, 2011). The goal of such
procedures is to protect examiners from receiving potentially biasing and task-irrelevant
information about a case while still providing them with case details that are considered
necessary and relevant to conducting their analyses.
One specific approach discussed in the contextual information management
literature involves the linear sequential unmasking procedure (Dror et al., 2015). It was
originally introduced as the “sequential unmasking” protocol to be used with DNA
evidence (Krane et al., 2008), but was later developed into a generalized step-wise
procedure that could be used with other types of forensic evidence (e.g., fingerprints) and
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was termed the ‘linear sequential unmasking’ procedure (Dror et al., 2015). The linear
sequential unmasking procedure requires examiners to receive contextual information
about the evidence and case in a linear, step-wise fashion. That is, initially examiners are
only presented with information that is absolutely critical and directly relevant to the
analyses requested (i.e., task-relevant information) before being asked to make an initial
comparison. Only after an initial review and comparison of the evidence do examiners
receive additional case information (i.e., task-irrelevant information). A critical element
of the linear sequential unmasking procedure is that once examiners are presented with
additional contextual information, they are allowed to revisit the evidence and make
changes to their initial judgment. The idea is that examiners’ observations and
conclusions will be documented at each step (Inman & Rudin, 2013). The linear
sequential unmasking procedure is usually paired with the suggestion that a case manager
be appointed to filter out the extraneous, task-irrelevant information and pass on only the
task-relevant information to the forensic examiner (Archer & Wallman, 2016; Dror et al.,
2015; Found & Ganas, 2013). Unfortunately, because of the lack of empirical research on
the linear sequential unmasking procedure, there has been no clear explanation as to the
exact steps that constitute this procedure or any detailed discussion of the challenges that
may arise when applying it to real-world cases.
There have only been a few published case studies examining the use of the linear
sequential unmasking procedure. For example, Archer and Wallman (2016) described a
forensic entomologist’s experience with employing the sequential unmasking procedure
in her lab and claimed that it increased the confidence in the validity of the examiner’s
judgments. That is, by eliminating contextual influences, the authors anticipated the
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examiner’s opinion about the evidence to increase in value to the court. However, the
forensic entomologist who used the procedure served as both the “case manager” and the
examiner, which led to the accidental disclosure of task-irrelevant and potentially biasing
information and ultimately defeats the purpose of using sequential unmasking.
An alternative contextual information management approach is the contextmanager model in which a context manager is responsible for deciding what information
in a case file is passed along to the forensic examiner (Mattijssen et al., 2016). Thus, the
context manager is the only individual who has complete access to the contextual
information (both relevant and irrelevant information) and provides the examiner only
with the information that is considered relevant to the examination. In this way, the
forensic examiner conducts their analyses without any biasing information.
Found and Ganas (2013) described an implementation of the context-manager
model at the Document Examination Unit of the Victoria Police Forensic Services
Department. They stated that no negative outcomes had resulted from the implementation
of the procedure and that the steps they had implemented were not overly timeconsuming or expensive. However, no data were provided to support this claim. As such,
it remains unknown exactly how much time and money were spent to implement such a
procedure. In addition, no experimental research on the proposed case-manager model
has been conducted to test the possible extent to which this method truly reduces the
effect of cognitive bias when analyzing forensic evidence. Nevertheless, researchers
continue to strongly advocate its use and, specifically, for the elimination of taskirrelevant information.
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Task-relevant versus task-irrelevant information. In addition to the lack of
information on the specific steps that should be taken by those who wish to use or
examine different contextual information management procedures, there is also a lack of
clarity surrounding what type of information is considered task-relevant and taskirrelevant (Inman & Rudin, 2013; Langenburg, 2017). Importantly, deciding what
constitutes task-relevant and task-irrelevant information is a much more difficult process
than what has been suggested by those advocating the use of a linear sequential
unmasking procedure or context-manager model (Inman & Rudin, 2013). Task-relevant
information has been generally defined as information that is directly related to the task at
hand and includes things such as the physical pieces of evidence being analyzed (Dror et
al., 2015). However, there is no exact definition or list of items that are considered
“critical” enough to be labeled as task-relevant. This is mostly because what is considered
to be task-relevant varies vastly on a case-by-case basis and depends largely on the type
of evidence being examined (e.g., DNA versus fingerprints; Inman & Rudin, 2013;
Langenburg, 2017). On the other hand, task-irrelevant information is loosely defined as
information that is composed of “unstated assumptions, information that is collateral, and
improper expectations and motivations” (Risinger et al., 2002, p.45), a rather ambiguous
and unspecific definition.
Practitioners’ Concerns
Although research examining the effect of cognitive bias in forensic sciences has
highlighted many potential dangers examiners face when presented with contextual
information prior to examining evidence, practitioners in the field are often hesitant to
accept these findings (Butt, 2013; Ostrom, 2009; Thornton, 2010). Specifically, expert
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examiners have often critiqued this research for using inexperienced students as
participants, having very small sample sizes and presenting participants with testing
materials beyond their level of expertise. In addition, expert examiners have various
concerns regarding the practicality of the recommendations researchers strongly advocate
for, such as blind testing, evidence lineups and linear sequential unmasking procedures
(Risinger et al., 2002; Thornton, 2010). Expert examiners argue that many of these
recommendations would require significantly more resources, would require a host of
decisions on an individual case level, and could in fact hinder their ability to make
accurate interpretations of the evidence (Risinger et al., 2002; Thornton, 2010).
Drawbacks to proposed solutions. As previously discussed, blind testing,
evidence lineups, and linear sequential unmasking procedures are all methods researchers
recommend forensic examiners use to decrease the effects of cognitive bias when
examining and interpreting evidence. However, each of these methods have their
individual limitations and drawbacks that often deter real-world forensic examiners from
incorporating them into their daily lab work. For example, practitioners continuously
argue that blind testing may actually hinder their ability to accurately evaluate a piece of
forensic evidence because certain contextual information is needed to properly analyze a
piece of evidence (Risinger et al., 2002). For instance, fingerprint examiners may need to
know the type of surface and where exactly the latent fingerprint was collected from.
Such information (e.g., whether prints were lifted from the inside or outside of a car
window) can inform examiners of extraneous factors (e.g., weather conditions) that can
affect the quality of the print and subsequent analyses. Because of this common critique,
researchers proposed the linear sequential unmasking procedure and the context-manager
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model, which would allow examiners to have the necessary contextual information while
remaining blind to task-irrelevant information that could bias their conclusions.
However, contextual information management procedures have not been fully
accepted by forensic examiners either. Practitioners are often concerned with the
additional resources that would be needed to implement a successful linear sequential
unmasking procedure or a case-manager model in their lab (Charlton, 2013). For
example, a case manager would need to be hired and extensively trained across forensic
disciplines to decide what information could and should be made available to examiners,
a difficult task that arguably escapes researchers outside the specific discipline. Hiring a
case manager would also strain already existing financial resources and require that
practitioners work within “leaner working models” (Charlton, 2013, p. 72). However,
recent work on the implementation of a “case-manager model,” suggests it has minimal
impact on the number of additional personnel required for the protocol, cost, or time
(Found & Ganas, 2013).
Implementing evidence lineups would also necessitate more resources considering
it would require an additional examiner to create the evidence lineup with similar-looking
‘foils’ (Risinger et al., 2002). Finding similar-lookinf foils is a particularly difficult task
considering the variation of evidence (e.g., fingerprints) in terms of difficulty and
similarity. For example, to properly create an evidence lineup for fingerprints, it would
first require fingerprint foils to be piloted with a number of fingerprint experts who assess
hundreds of prints to obtain average difficulty and similarity ratings for pairs of
fingerprints. Thus, in order to properly select similar-looking ‘foils’ for evidence lineups,
examiners would have to obtain from expert examiners an average similarity rating for
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the target piece of evidence and each potential foil to ensure an “unbiased” lineup. If
proper measures are not taken to obtain truly similar-looking foils, then the target piece
of evidence may simply be chosen because it stands out from the rest of the samples in
the evidence lineup.
Furthermore, a survey conducted by Kukucka, Kassin, Zapf, and Dror (2017),
found that the majority of forensic examiners they questioned believed they were immune
to bias or could reduce the effect of bias simply by willpower. As such, similar to other
professions, forensic examiners may underestimate the extent to which bias may
influence their work without a clear understanding of the automatic processes underlying
this effect, which in turn may decrease their openness to modifying procedures.
Commentaries written by forensic examiners about cognitive bias research often suggest
practitioners feel insulted by such research and proposed solutions. For example,
Thornton, an Emeritus Professor of Forensic Science at the University of California at
Berkeley with 20 years of experience in operational crime laboratories wrote “I reject the
insinuation that we do not have the wit or the intellectual capacity to deal with bias, of
whatever sort” (Thornton, 2010, p. 1663). Despite the fact that research strongly suggests
all individuals, regardless of profession, can fall prey to cognitive bias, concerns voiced
by practitioners regarding the various drawbacks that come with many of the proposed
solutions highlight the need for truly bi-directional research collaborations between
researchers and practitioners to tackle cognitive bias in forensic examinations.
Participant samples used in research. Another concern practitioners have raised
regarding the existing research examining the effect of cognitive bias in forensic contexts
is the use of student participants who have no experience or training analyzing forensic
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evidence (Ostrom, 2009). Although some research does suggest that contextual
information, such as the decision of a prior examiner (Dror & Charlton, 2006; Dror et al.,
2005), can also influence experts, sample sizes in studies using experts tend to be very
small, mainly because of the difficulty of recruiting experts in the field to participate in
research. For example, Dror and Charlton (2006) examined the effect of bias on
fingerprint analyses using only six fingerprint examiners. Similarly, in a second separate
study Dror, Charlton and Peron (2005), relied on data from five fingerprint examiners. It
is important to point out, however, that both of these studies used a within-participant
design, such that each pair of prints presented to the examiner-participants had been
previously analyzed by the same examiner within the normal course of their work.
Although using a within-participant design increases power, a sample of five to six expert
examiners arguably does not provide a sufficient experimental power and thus basis to
convincingly argue to practitioners that their own judgments can also be influenced by
cognitive bias.
In addition, the concern of using students who have no experience analyzing
forensic evidence is valid considering research has found that experience can moderate
the effect of cognitive bias (Langenburg et al., 2009). For example, in a study conducted
by Langenburg and colleagues (2009), both novice and expert examiners were recruited
as participants. Novice participants were composed of students with no experience or
training in fingerprint analyses, whereas expert participants were trained fingerprint
examiners recruited at an international conference. All participants were assigned either
to a control group, a high bias group or a low bias group. The control group received no
contextual information whereas the two bias groups received information regarding a
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previous examiner’s decision on the fingerprints that were to be analyzed. The low bias
group was simply told that the previous examiner was trained to competency and the high
bias group was told that the previous examiner was an internationally recognized expert.
They found that novices were more likely to agree with the high bias prompt than were
experts suggesting novices may be more influenced by bias than experts. Unfortunately,
the majority of research examining the effects of cognitive bias on forensic evidence
examination relies on collecting data from undergraduate students who have no
experience analyzing forensic evidence such as fingerprints – a skill that requires a
significant amount of training and expertise.
Type of evidence. Research has found that cognitive bias can affect the evaluation
and interpretation of various types of evidence (e.g., Dror & Hampikian, 2011; Elaad et
al., 1994; Kerstholt et al., 2010; Lange et al., 2011). However, different types of evidence
require vastly different levels and training. For example, analyzing DNA evidence
requires extensive academic training, analyzing fingerprint evidence requires extensive
specialized training differing in content and time from other pattern evidence such as
footwear impression evidence, which requires only basic visual-spatial abilities
(International Association for Identification, 2018; Sirchie, 2018). Taken together,
different pieces of forensic evidence require different levels of specialized training.
Therefore, presenting participants, who have no forensic evaluation experience, with
stimuli that require specialized training (e.g., fingerprints), may find an effect of bias not
because of the presence of contextual information, but because of the difficulty of the
task itself (Butt, 2013). The more ambiguous a decision-making task, the more likely a
participant is to look for external cues to guide his/her decision, thus inflating the
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estimated effect of cognitive bias (Dror et al., 2005). As such, results from studies using
inexperienced examiners are likely overestimating the effects of cognitive bias. The use
of stimuli that require specialized training coupled with the use of inexperienced
examiners are therefore important and valid concerns practitioners have regarding the
current body of work. The sampling and stimulus material issues present in the body of
work thus far render it difficult for researchers to convince forensic experts of the
likelihood and extent of cognitive bias found in these studies and to successfully advocate
for the implementation of bias-reducing procedures.
Present Study
Decades of research on the effects of cognitive bias suggest that having
expectations and prior beliefs can affect the way an individual interprets subsequent
information (Rosenthal, 1994). Specifically, individuals tend to look for information that
confirms their beliefs while ignoring information that disconfirms their beliefs (Ask &
Granhag, 2005; Nickerson, 1998). Research examining the effect of cognitive bias within
forensic contexts also finds a similar pattern of results, which has led to the development
of various procedures including blind testing and contextual information management
procedures, to decrease the effect of cognitive bias (Found & Ganas, 2013; Kassin et al.,
2013; Saks et al., 2003). However, only few studies have examined blind testing methods
and their ability to reduce the effect of bias on analyses of forensic evidence, with no
study to date experimentally testing contextual information management procedures to
eliminate task-irrelevant information with fingerprint and footwear impression evidence.
Relatedly, this lack of research has resulted in only a vague description of the specific
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steps that forensic examiners should take if implementing a linear sequential unmasking
procedure or a case-manager model in their lab.
The current study directly compares the effects of blind testing, redaction of taskirrelevant information and informed testing on forensic evidence analyses. It also offers a
first operationalization of eliminating task-irrelevant information within a field setting, in
collaboration with real-world forensic experts from the Miami-Dade Forensic Sciences
Bureau by using redaction procedures to eliminate any information from a lab analysis
request form (LAR) that is not necessary for examination purposes. To fully test the
potential for cognitive bias while investigating the strategy of contextual information
management procedures, the proposed study assigned participants to receive either no
information about the case summary (i.e., blind condition), a partially redacted LAR case
summary (i.e., task-irrelevant details blacked-out), or a non-blind LAR summary (i.e., all
case details available). In addition, after an initial judgment of the evidence was made, all
participants received a full case summary (with all details available) and were asked if
they would like to re-analyze the evidence, likened to real-world scenarios in which
examiners receive additional case information after analyzing evidence when using the
linear sequential unmasking procedure (Saks et al., 2003).
In line with past research on cognitive bias and forensic evidence analyses
demonstrating that having contextual information about a case, including suggestive and
guilt-presumptive details about a suspect, can result in more match judgments, than not
having contextual case information (e.g., Dror et al., 2005; Kassin & Kukucka, 2014), it
was hypothesized that redacting task-irrelevant information from LARs would reduce the
effect of contextual bias. Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants provided with
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a partially redacted LAR (i.e., no guilt-presumptive suspect information available) would
be more accurate in their judgments compared to participants who received a non-blind,
complete LAR (i.e., had guilt-presumptive suspect information available). That is,
examiners who receive the complete LAR would be less likely to judge a pair of nonmatching evidence samples as non-matches (i.e., correct exclusion) and more likely to
judge a pair of non-matching evidence samples as matching (i.e., false ID).
It was also predicted that blind testing procedures would decrease the effect of
bias such that participants would be more accurate at making match and non-match
judgments of evidence (i.e., more correct exclusions and fewer false IDs) compared to
participants who were provided with all case details about the case. However, it was also
predicted that participants who received no information about the crime would be less
likely to correctly judge a pair of matching samples of evidence as matching (i.e., correct
ID) and more likely to incorrectly judge a pair of matching evidence samples as nonmatches (i.e., incorrect exclusions) than those who received a partially redacted form, as
participants who were not given any information about the case did not have available to
them any task-relevant information compared to participants who were given a partially
redacted LAR. Task-relevant information is believed to help examiners make more
informed and accurate decisions (Inman & Rudin, 2013); participants who did not have
this information are thus expected to be at a greater disadvantage to those who did have
the task-relevant information on the partially redacted LAR. For example, knowing that
the fingerprints being analyzed where found inside of a car allows examiners to discount
any odd marks on the fingerprints as being a result from weather conditions.
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To obtain a fine-grained understanding of how each of these LAR conditions
affect examiners’ judgments, a signal detection approach was used. Specifically,
examiners were presented with both matching and non-matching samples of evidence in
order to calculate their discrimination accuracy, which measures the ability to accurately
discriminate between matching and non-matching pairs of evidence. Discrimination
accuracy takes into account the number of correct match (correct IDs) and false match
decisions (false IDs) made. Thus, in line with the previous hypotheses, it was predicted
that those provided with a partially redacted LAR would have significantly better
discrimination accuracy than those who were provided with a blind or non-blind LAR as
they would be more likely to render a correct match decision and less likely to make an
incorrect match decision.
Furthermore, individuals’ response bias was calculated to measure examiners’
match and non-match judgement tendencies. A “match response bias” was defined as an
individual’s tendency to judge a pair of evidence samples as matching regardless of
whether they were matches or not, whereas a “non-match response bias” was defined as
an individual’s tendency to make a non-match judgment regardless of whether they were
non-matches or not. It was predicted that examiners who received the non-blind LAR
would be more likely to show a match response bias compared to those who received the
blind or partially redacted LAR because participants provided with the non-blind LAR
would have information available to them that would bias them into making more match
judgments (i.e., suspects are in custody) regardless of the evidence samples’ ground truth.
Finally, because of a lack of information, participants in the blind condition were
predicted to be less confident in their judgements about the evidence compared to
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participants who received either all the information about the case or a partially redacted
case summary. Results from the present study thus served to inform which bias-reducing
procedures allow examiners to be the most accurate and confident in their decisions.
A secondary aim of the present study was to compare novice and expert
examiners’ performance when conducting forensic examinations as well as their
vulnerabilities to contextual bias. Although some research suggests that experts can be
influenced by task-irrelevant information (Dror et al., 2006), the majority of research
examining the effect of cognitive bias on analysis of forensic evidence relies on
collecting data from undergraduate students who have no experience analyzing forensic
evidence that require at least some level of specialized training (Dror et al., 2005;
Smalarz, Madon, Yang, Guyll, & Buck, 2016). Using participants who have no
experience analyzing forensic evidence may inflate the effect cognitive bias may have on
examiners’ interpretation of evidence as a consequence of its increased level of difficulty
and thus ambiguity when assessed by novices. The present study therefore systematically
investigated the differences in susceptibility to bias between novice and expert
examiners. It was hypothesized that novices would be more inaccurate (i.e., make more
incorrect match and non-match decisions) and have poorer discrimination accuracy than
expert forensic examiners, because of their lack of experience in analyzing the stimuli
used in the proposed study. For similar reasons, it was predicted that novice examiners
would be less confident in their judgments compared to expert examiners.
In addition, it was predicted that the main effect of experience would be qualified
by an interaction between contextual information available on the LAR and experience.
Specifically, because of the lack of experience and thus increased level of the difficulty
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of the task, novices were expected to be more influenced than experts by the taskirrelevant contextual information when it was available (i.e., non-blind LAR condition)
compared to when they were kept blind to case details or when task-irrelevant
information had been redacted.
Not only is it important to systematically investigate the possibility that research
conducted on undergraduate students may be inflating the presence of bias in the analysis
of forensic evidence, but it is also important to examine how the type of stimuli used in a
study can influence the likelihood of finding an effect of bias. Thus, the third aim of the
current study was to investigate the effect of contextual bias on examiners’ evaluation of
forensic evidence as a function of stimulus material. Specifically, the present study
compared the effect of cognitive bias when comparing fingerprints and footwear
impressions, with fingerprint examination requiring significantly more expertise and
training than footwear impression analyses (International Association for Identification,
2018; Sirchie, 2018). This comparison could help inform the specific contexts in which
cognitive bias may play a redcued versus enhanced role in forensic examinations. In
addition, as past research has failed to manipulate the type of stimuli presented to
participants, it is difficult to compare results across studies that differ in the type of
stimuli presented (e.g., footwear impressions versus handwriting samples versus
fingerprints). Thus, the present study was the first to directly compare the effect of
cognitively biasing conditions across different forensic stimuli.
It was hypothesized that contextual information would have a weaker impact on
examiners’ evaluations when the to-be-examined forensic evidence required less
specialized training (i.e., footwear impressions) compared to more difficult evidence
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samples (i.e., fingerprints). Finally, it was predicted that there would be an interaction
between examiner experience and stimulus material such that differences found between
novice examiners and expert forensic examiners would be greatest when evaluating
fingerprint evidence compared to footwear impression evidence because novice,
undergraduate examiners would be at a significantly larger disadvantage when analyzing
fingerprints. Thus, novice examiners would make a larger number of mistakes, have
poorer discrimination accuracy, and be less confident in their judgments compared to
expert examiners, but more so when judging fingerprint evidence compared to footwear
impression evidence.
In conclusion, the present study had the following primary objectives: (a) examine
the effect of contextual bias on examiners’ evaluation of forensic evidence by varying the
amount of pre-comparison information available to participants, (b) compare novice and
expert examiners’ performance when conducting forensic analyses and their
vulnerabilities to contextual bias, and (c) investigate the effect of contextual bias on
examiners’ evaluation of different types of forensic evidence. Together, these objectives
can inform both researchers and practitioners of the impact and feasibility of several
proposed solutions in reducing the effect of contextual bias across different forensic
domains. In addition, the current study directly addresses concerns voiced by forensic
scientists and practitioners including the use of undergraduate students as participants and
using stimuli that are considered to require more specialized training.
Two pilot studies were first conducted for the purpose of stimulus material
selection and to minimize the potential of confounding variables in the Main Study. Pilot
Study One was conducted to select the fingerprint evidence stimuli to be used in Pilot
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Study Two and the Main Study. The primary aim of Pilot Study One was to obtain
ratings for fingerprint stimuli pairs from undergraduate students who had no experience
analyzing fingerprint evidence in order to select fingerprint pairs that were of comparable
difficulty level to latent fingerprint experts’ ratings. In order to minimize the presence of
a confounding variable (i.e., difference in perceived task difficulty) fingerprints of
comparable difficulty for experts and novices were selected from Pilot Study One so that
examiner experience, and not task difficulty, would yield any potential differences
between novice and expert examiners the Main Study. Pilot Study Two was conducted to
test the bias in the central manipulations of the Main Study. Specifically, the main aim of
Pilot Study Two was to ensure that the LAR containing all the case information resulted
in more incorrect match judgements than the LAR with no case information (i.e., blind
testing procedure).
CHAPTER II
PILOT STUDY ONE METHODS
Participants
A total of 82 students (N = 82) at a large southeastern university were recruited
via the university’s psychology research participation system in exchange for course
credit. The final sample of 82 students was 78% female (n = 64) and representative of the
community from which they were drawn (67.1% Hispanic, 14.6% African American,
9.8% Caucasian, 3.7% Asian American, and 4.9% Other). The sample ranged in age from
18 to 34 years (M = 20.93, SD = 3.49).
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Materials
Match fingerprint pair stimuli. Fingerprints from a previous study examining
the efficacy of the ACE-V fingerprint analyses procedure conducted by the Miami-Dade
Forensic Services Bureau (MDFSB) (Pacheco, Cerchiai, & Stoiloff, 2014) were used for
the current study. In the previous study, fingerprint standards and multiple latent prints
were collected from nine different individuals. Latent prints are prints lifted from objects
and surfaces whereas standard prints are those collected directly from the individual. A
total of 80 final photographs of latent prints collected from flat and curved surfaces (i.e.,
plastic, tile, metal and glass) were provided by each of the nine volunteers (out of 720
total). Latent prints were lifted using black powder, tape, and white backing cards. These
cards were then scanned to create individual photographs. Each individual’s prints were
then rated by three certified latent print examiners on several dimensions including
strength of value of latent print, whether the latent was in agreement with the standard,
and difficulty of the comparison. The strength of value of the latent print referred to the
clarity of the latent print and the agreement referred to whether the latent print and the
standard matched in clarity and had the same minutiae present. Minutiae were defined as
those characteristics of a fingerprint that make it unique compared to other fingerprints
(e.g., bifurcations, ending ridges, dots).
The difficulty level of the comparisons was calculated by averaging the scores the
print received on the strength of value and agreement with standard ratings. Each print
was then categorized into one of the three following categories: (a) insufficient to
difficult, (b) difficult to moderate, or (c) moderate to easy. On the basis of the study
conducted by Pacheco and colleagues (2014), a total of 15 latent prints along with their
35

corresponding standard print were classified into the ‘moderate to easy’ category by three
forensic examiners, nine were classified as ‘difficult to moderate,’ and 12 were classified
as ‘insufficient to difficult.’
In order to address a critical limitation and confound present in previous research
examining the effect of cognitive bias in forensic analyses, ‘moderate to easy’
fingerprints shown to expert examiners in Pachecho and colleagues’ (2014) initial study
were pilot-tested with student examiners to ensure that the fingerprints chosen for the
Main Study were rated as ‘moderate to easy’ by both forensic experts and students, who
would constitute the participant pool in the proposed Main Study. The decision to include
only the ‘moderate to easy’ difficulty level in the proposed final study as opposed to
fingerprints categorized into one of the other two more difficult categories was
determined because forensic examiners typically use specialized fingerprint marking
software programs (i.e., CSIpix and PiAnoS) to analyze fingerprints which was unable to
be included in this study. That is, for logistic purposes, the proposed study used Qualtrics,
an online research system that allows the distribution of all research materials to
participating students and experts across the country. As Qualtrics does not allow the
incorporation of the fingerprint marking software commonly used by forensic examiners
and student examiners are unfamiliar with this software, the researcher instead opted for
the inclusion of only ‘easy to moderate’ fingerprints. This allowed for both student and
expert examiners to compare prints without software while simultaneously eliminating
the alternative explanation for differences across expertise being due to familiarity with
the software.
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On the basis of the results of Pachecho and colleagues’ (2014) initial study, the
final stimulus material for matching fingerprint pairs for this pilot study consisted of a
total of 15 standard and 15 latent ‘moderate to easy’ difficulty level fingerprints. In
addition, in order to increase the range of ratings participants used, two ‘difficult to
moderate’ and two ‘insufficient to difficult’ matching fingerprint pairs were also included
into the final stimulus material of Pilot Study One, amounting to a total of 19 matching
fingerprint pairs.
Non-match fingerprint pair stimuli. Each of the 19 standard prints were
combined with each of the latent prints of the same difficulty category that did not
originate from the same person in order to develop the non-matching print pairs. Thus, a
total of 200 non-matching fingerprint pairs were created for piloting.
Procedure
Student participants were scheduled to come into the lab to participate in the
study. Once participants arrived at the lab, they were seated in front of a computer. All
study procedures were administered via Qualtrics. After online consent was obtained,
each student participant was randomly presented with 13 of the 15 ‘moderate to easy’
matching fingerprint pairs, one of the two ‘difficult to moderate’ matching fingerprint
pairs, one of the two ‘insufficient to difficult’ matching fingerprint pairs, and 15 of the
non-matching fingerprint pairs, totaling 30 fingerprint pairs.
Fingerprint pairs were shown one at a time and participants were asked to judge
each pair of prints on three different rating scales that were similar to those used by the
expert latent print examiners in Pachecho and colleagues’ (2014) study. To account for
undergraduate students’ lack of expertise, the rating scale was modified. Specifically,
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students were not asked to count the number of minutiae on each fingerprint and were
instead simply asked to rate the clarity of the latent print on a 7-point scale with higher
numbers indicating better clarity. Additionally, after viewing each pair of prints, students
were asked to rate the similarity between the fingerprint pairs on a 7-point scale with
higher numbers indicating higher similarity. Finally, students were asked to determine
whether the prints were a match, non-match or inconclusive and rate the difficulty of the
comparison on a 7-point scale with higher numbers indicating higher difficulty.
CHAPTER III
PILOT STUDY ONE RESULTS
The clarity of the latent print (reverse coded), similarity of prints, and difficulty of
comparison ratings were averaged across participants for each pair of fingerprints. Those
pairs receiving an average difficulty rating between five and seven points were
categorized into the ‘insufficient to difficult category,’ those between three and five
points were categorized as ‘difficult to moderate,’ and those between one and three points
were categorized as ‘moderate to easy.’ Once all fingerprint pairs had been categorized
into one of the three categories, only those fingerprint pairs that both experts and students
had labeled as ‘moderate to easy’ were selected to be used in Pilot Study Two and the
Main Study.
Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the average difficulty rating for each of
the matching and non-matching fingerprint pairs. Once the average difficulty rating was
calculated for each pair of fingerprints, they were classified into one of the three
difficulty level categories (moderate to easy, difficult to moderate, and insufficient to
difficult). Frequencies for the total number of fingerprints classified as ‘moderate to
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easy,’ ‘difficult to moderate,’ and ‘insufficient to difficult’ were computed in addition to
the percentage of correct, incorrect, and inconclusive decisions made for each match and
non-match fingerprint across the three difficulty levels.
Match Fingerprint Judgments
Across all three difficulty category levels, none (0%, n = 0) of the matching
fingerprint pairs were perceived by students as ‘moderate to easy’ or ‘insufficient to
difficult.’ Instead, all (100%, n = 19) were classified as ‘difficult to moderate.’ In
addition, for ‘moderate to easy’ match fingerprint pairs, the majority of participants made
accurate match decisions (47%), followed by inconclusive decisions (27.91%) and
incorrect non-match decisions (24.59%). For ‘difficult to moderate’ match fingerprint
pairs, most participants made inconclusive decisions (40.1%) followed by incorrect nonmatch decisions (36.2%) and correct match decisions (23.7%). For ‘insufficient to
difficult’ match fingerprint pairs, the majority of participants made inconclusive
decisions (78%) followed by incorrect non-match decisions (20.7%) and correct match
decisions (1.3%; see Figure 1).
Non-Match Fingerprint Judgments
Similar results were found for non-match fingerprint pairs such that across all
three difficulty categories, the majority of comparisons were rated as being ‘difficult to
moderate’ (97.62%). Specifically, for fingerprint pairs in the ‘moderate to easy’ category,
only 5.1% of the pairs were perceived by students as ‘moderate to easy,’ with the
majority of students (92.86%) rating them as ‘difficult to moderate’ and some even
perceiving them as ‘insufficient to difficult’ (1.5%). For fingerprint pairs in the ‘difficult
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to moderate’ and ‘insufficient to difficult’ category, all pairs (100%) were perceived as
being ‘difficult to moderate’ by student participants.
In addition, for ‘moderate to easy’ non-match fingerprint pairs, the majority of
participants made accurate non-match decisions (50.32%), followed by inconclusive
decisions (29.05%) and incorrect match decisions (20.64%). For ‘difficult to moderate’
non-match fingerprint pairs, most participants made inconclusive decisions (49%)
followed by correct non-match decisions (33.80%), and incorrect match decisions
(17.20%). For ‘insufficient to difficult’ match fingerprint pairs, the majority of
participants made inconclusive decisions (71.05%) followed by correct non-match
decisions (28.95%) and no participants made an incorrect match decision (0%; see Figure
2).
Selection of Match and Non-Match Fingerprint Pairs for Pilot Study Two
Unfortunately, albeit unsurprisingly, students perceived the fingerprint
comparisons to be more difficult than the expert latent fingerprint examiners as evidenced
by the very few pairs categorized by students as ‘moderate to easy.’ Since none of the
match fingerprints were perceived to be ‘moderate to easy,’ the four match fingerprint
pairs with the lowest average difficulty ratings were selected to be used for Pilot Study
Two. For selection of the non-match fingerprint pairs to be used in Pilot Study Two, all
non-match fingerprints that fell within the range of the difficulty rating of the four match
fingerprint pairs selected were grouped together. From these, four non-matching
fingerprint pairs were randomly selected to pair (in terms of difficulty level) with the
matching fingerprint pairs.
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CHAPTER IV
PILOT STUDY TWO METHODS
Design
A 2 (Contextual Information: blind vs. non-blind) X 2 (Stimulus Material:
footwear impression vs. fingerprint) mixed factorial design was employed with stimulus
material and stimulus pair manipulated within participants. The primary aim of Pilot
Study Two was to test the bias of the central manipulation of the Main Study.
Participants
A total of 96 (N = 96) students at a large southeastern university were recruited
via the University’s psychology research participation system in exchange for course
credit. Of these participants, two participants were excluded because they did not
consent, 36 participants because they did not pass the instructions quiz, and 10
participants because they did not pass the manipulation check question. The final sample
of 48 (n = 48) students was 83.3% female (n = 40) and representative of the community
from which they were drawn (68.8% Hispanic, 25% African American, 4.2% Caucasian,
and 2.1% Asian American). They ranged in age from 19 to 61 years (M = 22.94, SD =
7.52).
Materials
Lab analysis request forms. Lab analysis request forms mirrored those used by
the MDFSB (see Appendix A). They contained basic information such as the name of the
lead investigator, type of offense, name of suspects, name of victims, description of the
case, and description of the evidence. These pieces of information are commonly found
on LARs (sometimes referred to as evidence submission forms) used across the United
41

States (Gardner, Kelley, Murrie, & Blaisdell, 2019). Specifically, in a recent study,
Gardner and colleagues (2019) collected LARs from different forensic labs across the
United States to gather information on the type of information that is typically included
on such forms. They found that many request similar information compared to the LAR
used in the proposed study. For example, 94.8% ask about the type of offense, 94.8% ask
for the name of suspect(s), 92.8% ask for the name of victim(s), 45.5% ask for a
description of the case, and 88.7% ask for a description of the evidence. As such, the
LAR used in the proposed study was developed in accordance with this information to be
representative of information typically gathered in other U.S. forensic lab’s LARs.
LAR case summaries. A total of two versions of the LAR were piloted in the
present study to ensure differences between providing all case summary details (i.e., nonblind condition) and providing no case summary details (i.e., blind condition) on
examiners’ judgements of fingerprint and footwear impression evidence. Specifically,
participants in the ‘non-blind’ condition received all case details in the summary, as is
currently the case in the MDFSB, which consisted of both task-relevant and irrelevant
(e.g., potentially biasing) information. The case summary was developed in close
collaboration with a forensic expert to allow for a realistic version and portrayed a realworld armed robbery in Miami, Florida that involved one female victim and two male
perpetrators. In addition, the case summary included various pieces of information that
are commonly found on LARs, but have the potential to bias examiners’ decisions when
analyzing forensic evidence.
Initially, within the non-blind LAR, participants were made aware that both
subjects were in custody, were given information about the suspects’ criminal history and
42

were also told that surveillance footage of the two suspects committing the crime was
obtained. The objective was to bias participants into thinking that the suspects in custody
were likely to be guilty, potentially leading participants to make more incorrect match
judgements when analyzing non-matching pieces of forensic evidence compared to
participants who did not received such biasing information of the suspects. On the other
hand, participants in the ‘blind’ condition were given a case summary containing only the
word “routine” (see Appendix B). This served as the ‘blind’ condition because
participants had neither case-specific nor biasing information that was provided to
participants in the non-blind condition. After consulting with the commander of the
MDFSB, the word “Routine” was chosen to be entered in the case summary section of
the blind LAR to increase external validity as this term is commonly found on LARs,
despite the fact that it provides examiners with no substantive information about the case.
Preliminary analyses conducted during the initial stages of data collection
revealed an unsuccessful manipulation of the LAR form such that we found a significant
effect of LAR form on participant’s accuracy rate, F(1, 82) = 4.34, p = .040, in the
opposite expected direction. Specifically, participants who received the biasing LAR had
higher accuracy rates (M = 0.46, SD = 0.28) than participants who received the blind
LAR (M = 0.33, SD = 0.25). It was believed that some of the information provided to
participants in the biasing condition (i.e., surveillance footage of suspects committing the
crime) led student participants to become particularly skeptical of the case summary
information and pay more attention to the evidence when analyzing the footwear
impressions and fingerprint evidence. As a result, we decided to decrease the level of
“obvious” bias by eliminating the surveillance footage evidence found in the biasing
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LAR case summary for the remainder of pilot study two. However, participants were still
provided with information regarding the suspects’ custody status and criminal history
along with the remaining pieces of information regarding the armed robbery (see
Appendix C).
Fingerprint stimuli pairs. Fingerprints selected for this pilot study were chosen
from the same pool of fingerprints used for Pilot Study One. However, for Pilot Study
Two only the easiest non-matching fingerprint pairs were used. Due to the Pilot Study
One results (no match fingerprint pairs were categorized as ‘moderate to easy’), it was
necessary to choose non-matching fingerprint pairs that had comparable difficulty ratings
to matching fingerprint pairs since both match and non-match fingerprint pairs would be
used for the Main Study. Thus, four non-matching fingerprint pairs were randomly
selected from a pool of non-matching fingerprint pairs that had similar difficulty ratings
as the matching fingerprint pairs with the lowest difficulty ratings (Mdifficulty = 3.37 –
4.29). Four fingerprint pairs were chosen for stimulus generalization purposes. The
average difficulty rating for each of the four fingerprint pairs did not significantly differ
from one another (all p > .05). Of the four randomly selected non-matching fingerprint
pairs chosen for Pilot Study Two, each participant was presented with only two
fingerprint pairs due to study material, design and procedures. That is, on the LAR
provided to participants, there were only two fingerprints that were collected at the crime
scene.
Footwear impression stimuli pairs. Footwear impressions were selected from a
footwear impressions matching exam that was previously used by the MDFSB as part of
their interview for entry level forensic examiners. The exam consisted of 10 matching
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and 94 non-matching footwear impression pairs. These footwear impressions’ difficulty
levels had been piloted as part of another ongoing study. A total of 145 undergraduate
students were recruited as part of this previous pilot study and were asked to classify each
matching and non-matching footwear impression pair as either a match, non-match, or
made an inconclusive decision. They were also asked to rate their confidence in the
decision and the level of difficulty on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all
difficult/confident to 7 = extremely difficult/confident). Footwear impression pairs were
categorized into three levels based on these pilot data. Similar to the fingerprint evidence
pairs in Pilot Study One, footwear impression pairs were categorized as either a)
insufficient to difficult, b) difficult to moderate, or c) moderate to easy.
Similar to the fingerprint evidence, an average difficulty and confidence rating for
each footwear impression pair was computed. Those comparisons that received between
five to seven points were categorized into the ‘insufficient to difficult’ category, those
with three to five points were categorized as ‘difficult to moderate,’ and those which
received one to three points were categorized as ‘moderate to easy.’ For the current pilot
study only ‘moderate to easy’ non-matching footwear impression pairs were used.
Specifically, of the 94 non-matching pairs, 25 were labeled as ‘moderate to easy.’ Of
these 25, four non-matching footwear impression pairs were randomly selected to be used
for Pilot Study Two for stimulus generalization purposes. Each participant was randomly
presented with two of the possible four footwear impression pairs due to study material,
design and procedures. That is, on the LAR provided to participants, there were only two
footwear impressions that were collected at the crime scene.
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Procedure
Participants completed all study procedures via a Qualtrics online survey. After
online consent was obtained, participants received basic task instructions. Specifically,
they were told that they would be presented with an LAR and given information
explaining what an LAR is and the type of information that can be found on the form.
Participants were also informed that they would be asked to analyze various pieces of
evidence from a crime scene including two footwear impressions and two fingerprints
and make a match, non-match, or inconclusive decision. A matching pair was defined as
a pair of prints originating from the same source (i.e., they came from the same person)
and a non-matching pair was defined as prints originating from different sources (i.e.,
they came from different people). An inconclusive decision was defined as prints having
insufficient detail for a conclusive determination to be made (e.g., “I don’t know”
response). Participants were then instructed to carefully read the LAR before making any
decisions and were told that they could refer back to the LAR whenever they felt
necessary.
Once participants read and understood the initial instructions, they were randomly
presented with one of the two possible LARs (i.e., blind or non-blind LAR). After
reading the LAR, they were randomly shown one of the four pieces of evidence.
Specifically, they were shown either one of the four possible non-matching footwear
impression pairs or one of the four non-matching fingerprint pairs. After analyzing the
first pair of evidence, they were asked to make a match or non-match decision. The LAR
was available to participants during each comparison. After completing the ratings for the
first pair of evidence (either fingerprint or footwear impression), they were shown the
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second piece of evidence. The same procedure was employed for the remaining pieces of
evidence. Once participants had completed comparing all four pieces of evidence, they
were provided with a demographics questionnaire. After the completion of the
demographics questionnaire, participants were debriefed and thanked for their time.
Coding of Outcome Variables
Match and non-match judgments. Participants’ match and non-match
judgements were coded as correct or incorrect. As all pairs of evidence presented to
participants were non-matches, all match judgements were coded as incorrect and all
non-match judgments were coded as correct. Average accuracy scores for fingerprints
and footwear impressions were calculated by dividing the total number of correct
judgments made by the total number of judgments made.
CHAPTER V
PILOT STUDY TWO RESULTS
Only data from the participants recruited after the non-blind LAR was updated
were included in the following analyses. Thus, participants who received the original
non-blind LAR which included the surveillance footage detail were excluded from all
subsequent analyses.
Match Judgments
A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of LAR and
evidence type on number of incorrect match judgments made. There was no significant
effect of LAR, F(1, 46) = 0.86, p = .358 on number of incorrect match judgments.
However, there was a significant effect of evidence type, F(1, 46) = 39.09, p < .001 such
that participants made more incorrect match judgments when judging footwear
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impression evidence (M = 1.11, SE = 0.12) than when judging fingerprint evidence (M =
0.36, SE = 0.08). There was no significant interaction between LAR and evidence type,
F(1, 46) = 0.07, p = .788.
Non-Match Judgments
A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of LAR and
evidence type on number of correct non-match judgments made. There was no significant
effect of LAR, F(1, 46) = 1.00, p = .753 on number of correct non-match judgments.
However, as with match judgments, there was a significant effect of evidence type on
non-match judgments, F(1, 46) = 18.06, p < .001 such that participants made more
correct non-match judgments when judging fingerprint evidence (M = 1.07, SE = 0.10)
than when judging footwear impression evidence (M = 0.57, SE = 0.12). There was no
significant interaction between LAR and evidence type, F(1, 46) = 0.49, p = .489.
Inconclusive Judgments
A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of LAR and
evidence type on number of inconclusive judgments made. There was no significant
effect of LAR on the number of inconclusive decisions made, F(1, 46) = 2.85, p = .089
and no significant effect of evidence type, F(1, 46) = 3.99, p = .052. The interaction was
also non-significant, F(1, 46) = 0.83, p = .368.
Overall Accuracy Rate
A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effects of LAR and
evidence type on participants’ overall accuracy rate. Although there was no significant
effect of LAR on accuracy rate, F(1, 46) = 0.10, p = .753, it is important to note the
successful shift in results compared to the preliminary findings reported above.
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Specifically, changes to the LAR resulted in lower accuracy rates – albeit not
significantly so - in participants who were presented with the biasing LAR (M = 0.39, SE
= 0.07) than those presented with the blind LAR (M = 0.42, SE = .06), which was the
opposite of what was found before changes were made. Unfortunately, due to time
constraints and difficulties with participant recruitment, we were unable to collect more
data, which may have increased power and thus rendered this difference statistically
significant. However, because we did see a change in the hypothesized direction of the
effect the same LARs were used to manipulate contextual information in the Main Study.
There was also a significant effect of evidence type, F(1, 46) = 18.06, p < .001, such that
participants were significantly more accurate when judging fingerprint evidence (M =
0.53, SE = 0.05) than when judging footwear impression evidence (M = 0.28, SD = 0.06).
The interaction between LAR and evidence type was not significant, F(1, 46) = 0.49, p =
.489.
CHAPTER VI
MAIN STUDY METHODS
Design
A 3 (Contextual Information: blind vs. non-blind vs. partially redacted) X 2
(Examiner Experience: expert vs. novice) X 2 (Stimulus Material: footwear impression
vs. fingerprint) X 2 (Stimulus Pair: match vs. non-match) mixed factorial design was
employed with stimulus material and stimulus pair manipulated within participants.
Participants
Novice examiners were composed of undergraduate students from a large
southeastern university. A total of 442 novices (N = 442) were recruited via the
49

university’s psychology research participation system in exchange for course credit. Of
these participants, 155 participants were excluded because they did not pass the
instructions quiz, they did not pass the LAR Questionnaire, and/or they did not allow us
to use their data after being debriefed. The final sample of 287 novices (n = 287) was
83.3% female (n = 239) and representative of the community from which they were
drawn (70.4% Hispanic, 14.6% African American, 11.5% Caucasian, 1.4% Asian or
Pacific Islander, 0.3% Native American or American Indian, and 1.4% Other). They
ranged in age from 18 to 63 years (M = 22.85, SD = 5.89). One participant did not report
their gender, age or ethnicity.
Expert examiners were composed of latent fingerprint expert examiners from
forensic laboratories across the United States. A total of 59 experts (N = 59) were
recruited via multiple forensic laboratory email listservers, websites, and newsletters. Of
these participants, four participants were excluded because they did not consent, did not
pass the instructions quiz, did not pass the LAR Questionnaire, and/or they did not allow
us to use their data after being debriefed. The final sample of 55 experts (n = 55) was
mainly female (72.7%) and Caucasian (90.9%), followed by Hispanic (3.6%), Asian or
Pacific Islander (1.8%), and Native American or American Indian (1.8%). One
participant did not report their gender, age, or ethnicity. They ranged in age from 23 to 63
years (M = 39.15, SD = 10.72) with an average number of 10.86 years of active casework
experience (M = 10.86, SD = 9.06).
Materials
Fingerprint stimuli pairs. Each participant was presented with two of the four
non-matching fingerprint pairs used in Pilot Study Two. The difficulty ratings of these
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two non-matching fingerprint pairs were then used to select two matching fingerprint
pairs to ensure that matching and non-matching fingerprint pairs had comparable
difficulty levels. Thus, a total of four fingerprint pairs with similar (low) difficulty ratings
were selected for stimulus generalization purposes. Prior to data collection, analyses were
conducted to ensure that matching and non-matching fingerprint pairs did not differ in
average difficulty rating. Results revealed that the fingerprints did not significantly differ
from one another (all p > .05).
Although fingerprint pairs selected for the Main Study were rated by experts as
‘moderate to easy,’ it is important to note that, as shown by Pilot Study One results,
students found these to be ‘difficult to moderate’ (no match fingerprint pairs were rated
as ‘moderate to easy’ by students). Nonetheless, those chosen for the Main Study
consisted of the pairs students rated as being the easiest of the ‘difficult to moderate’
category (MDifficulty = 4.30, SD = .90).
Each participant was randomly presented with one matching and one nonmatching fingerprint pair from the final pool of fingerprints. Participants were only
shown a total of two fingerprint pairs due to study material, design and procedures. That
is, participants received an LAR describing the evidence collected at the crime scene and
were told that only two fingerprints were collected and needed to be analyzed before
being presented with the fingerprints.
Footwear impression stimuli pairs. Similar to the fingerprint stimuli pairs, two
of the four non-matching footwear impression pairs used in Pilot Study Two were
randomly selected. The difficulty ratings of these two footwear impressions pairs were
then used to select the two matching footwear impression pairs to ensure that both
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matching and non-matching pairs selected had comparable difficulty levels. Thus, a total
of four footwear impression pairs categorized as ‘moderate to easy’ were selected.
Analyses were conducted to ensure that matching and non-matching footwear impression
pairs did not differ in average difficulty rating. Results revealed that the footwear
impression pairs’ difficulty rating did not significantly differ from one another (all p >
.05). Given that the ability to compare the footwear impressions used in the proposed
study was not expected to differ across levels of expertise, these stimuli were not piloted
with forensic experts.
Each participant was randomly presented with one matching and one nonmatching footwear impression pair from the final pool of two matching and two nonmatching footwear impressions. Participants were only presented with a total of two
footwear impression pairs due to study material, design and procedures. That is,
participants received an LAR describing the evidence collected at the crime scene and
were told that only two footwear impressions had been collected at the crime scene and
needed to be analyzed.
General task instructions. Participants were provided with general instructions
that provided them with information regarding the tasks they would be asked to complete.
First, participants were told that they would be presented with evidence obtained from a
real-world case and their job was to accurately analyze various pieces of forensic
evidence. Participants were also told that before analyzing the forensic evidence, they
would be presented with an LAR containing information about the case and evidence.
Before being presented with the LAR, participants received a description of the forensic
evidence and were told that they would be shown various prints, some of which would be
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footwear impressions and others fingerprints. Further clarification was provided to
participants by stating that they would be presented with footprint impressions and latent
fingerprints that were collected at a crime scene along with their standards. Basic
definitions for standard and latent prints were also provided to all participants.
Participants were then instructed to compare each latent print (i.e., print collected at the
crime scene) with its standard (i.e., known print collected directly from individual) and
judge whether they were a match, non-match, or inconclusive. Similar to Pilot Study
Two, a match was defined as a pair of prints originating from the same source (i.e., they
came from the same person), a non-match was defined as prints originating from different
sources (i.e., they came from different people), and an inconclusive decision was defined
as prints having insufficient detail for a conclusive determination to be made (e.g., “I
don’t know” response).
Lab analysis request forms. The same blind and non-blind lab analysis request
forms from Pilot Study Two were used for the present study in addition to a third version
of the LAR. Thus, there were a total of three versions of the LAR in order to manipulate
the amount of contextual information given to examiners and to examine the effect of
redacting task-irrelevant information. Lab analysis request forms across all three
experimental conditions were identical with the exception of the “Brief Case Summary”
section. That is, the name of the lead investigator, the type of offense, information found
in the routing table, etc. was included in all LARs. However, like in Pilot Study Two, the
amount of available information about the case varied depending on each participants’
randomized condition. Specifically, participants in the ‘non-blind’ condition received all
case details in the summary and those in the ‘blind’ condition were given a case summary
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containing only the word “Routine.” The third version of the LAR was the ‘partially
redacted’ condition in which participants received the same case summary as the nonblind participants, but with task-irrelevant details redacted (i.e., blacked-out; see
Appendix D). As suggested by various contextual information management procedures
including the linear sequential unmasking procedure, only the critical and task-relevant
details were available to participants. To decide which details should be redacted, a
forensic expert, the Senior Police Bureau Commander of the MDFSB, was consulted to
determine which details were absolutely necessary for examiners to know (see Appendix
E for list of critical details). All other task-irrelevant details were redacted.
Time 1 dependent measures. After viewing each pair of prints, participants
were asked to make a match, non-match or inconclusive judgment. A match judgment
indicated that the two pieces of evidence shown originated from the same individual,
whereas a non-match judgment indicated that the pair of evidence did not originate from
the same individual. An inconclusive judgment was made if the participant felt that there
was insufficient detail in the prints to make a conclusive decision. Participants were also
asked to rate the confidence in their decision on a 7-point Likert scale with higher
numbers indicating higher confidence.
LAR questionnaire. All participants received an LAR questionnaire to ensure
they had understood the instructions provided to them and had read the LAR, thus also
serving as a manipulation check questionnaire. Participants were asked questions
regarding information they may or may not have been exposed to in the case summary
(see Appendix F). All participants were first asked to write down everything they
remembered about the information provided in the lab request form before answering a
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series of multiple-choice questions. Participants were asked basic questions regarding the
type of case summary they received and the evidence they were asked to analyze. Next,
they were asked to answer questions regarding details of the crime that were consistent
across the three versions of the LAR. Specifically, all participants received questions
about the type of crime that occurred, how many suspects were involved, how many
victims were involved, and what item was brought in as evidence. Answers across
conditions were expected to be similar given that all LARs contained this information.
Next, participants were asked multiple-choice questions regarding specific
information that may or may not have been available in the case summary depending on
the condition they were assigned to. Specifically, they were asked questions about where
the victim was coming from, where the crime took place, what the suspects demanded
from the victim, what weapon was used, what item was taken from the victim, where the
car was parked, and how many suspects were in custody. Participants were also presented
with various options including an “Information not given” response, which would be the
correct answer for the specific questions that asked about pieces of information that were
unavailable to participants in the partially redacted and blind conditions.
Time 2 dependent measures. After being presented with an LAR containing all
information at Time 2 (see procedure), participants were asked if they would like to
change any of the previous decisions they made concerning the pieces of evidence they
analyzed. If they indicated that they would like to change any of their initial decisions,
they were asked to judge the same pieces of evidence a second time and make a match,
non-match or inconclusive decision. If they decided to change their initial decision, they
were also asked to provide an explanation as to why they decided to make the change.
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Perceptions questionnaire. Participants were also presented with a questionnaire
that was used to gauge their overall perception of the evidence, the LAR and their
experience participating in the study (see Appendix G). They were first asked to rate how
accurate they believed they were in analyzing the different pieces of evidence on a scale
from 0 – 100% and were also asked to rate how guilty they believed each suspect was on
a scale from 1 (definitely innocent) to 10 (definitely guilty). In addition, depending on
what condition they were assigned to, they answered questions about whether they
thought the case summary provided sufficient information to make accurate decisions and
whether they thought they would have been influenced by having additional information
about the case. Finally, they were asked what type of LAR they preferred to have when
analyzing forensic evidence.
Demographics questionnaire. Participants were also asked basic demographic
questions regarding their age, gender, ethnicity, education, and occupation (see Appendix
H). Forensic experts were asked additional questions about their work experience as
forensic latent fingerprint examiners. Specifically, experts were asked about the numbers
of years of active casework experience they had completed, the type of law enforcement
agency they were currently employed by, whether they examine other types of forensic
evidence in addition to latent print examinations, and the type and duration of any
structured latent fingerprint training program they had received.
Debriefing script. The debriefing script informed participants of the true nature
of the experiment after participants completed the experiment and provided them with the
contact information of the researchers in charge of the study. They were also given the
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opportunity to deny the use of their data for final analyses after reading the debriefing
script.
Procedure
For recruiting purposes, participants were told that the study consisted of
examining various pieces of forensic evidence that were taken from a real-world criminal
case. Participants were under the impression that the main purpose of the study was to
examine the importance of piloting materials (e.g., case reports, lab analysis request
forms, and pieces of forensic evidence) used for routine proficiency testing of forensic
scientists. However, after the collection of the first 14 expert examiners, it was suggested
that recruitment would not go well with the existing “cover story” because of examiners’
expected skepticism regarding the materials being part of existing proficiency exams.
They were expected to be skeptical because of their experience with professionally
distributed proficiency exams. Thus, the wording used for recruitment purposes was
made more general such that participants were instead told that the purpose of the current
study was simply to examine the importance of testing stimulus materials (e.g., police
case reports, evidence submission forms, and pieces of forensic evidence). The only
changes made were the deletion of the “proficiency testing” wording. This change was
implemented after having collected 14 expert participants and 189 student participants.
We do not believe that this change in recruitment wording had an effect on student
participants performance, given that when asked what they believed the study was about,
only one of the 189 students recalled that the purpose of the experiment had something to
do with testing materials for proficiency exams suggesting students did not pay much
attention to the cover story.
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Once participants decided to participate in the study, they were provided with a
Qualtrics survey link and brief instructions stating that they would have as much time as
they need to complete the study. However, they were also told that the study was to be
completed in one sitting. All study procedures were administered via the university’s
online Qualtrics survey program. Novices (i.e., undergraduate students) were provided
with the survey link via SONA systems in order to receive credit for participating,
whereas experts were emailed the link to the survey or clicked on the survey link if it
appeared on a laboratories’ website or newsletter. All participants completed the online
study alone and on their own time.
After online consent was obtained, participants received the general task
instructions regarding the specific tasks they would be asked to complete. Once
participants finished reading the instructions, they were asked to take a quiz about the
instructions they had just read. After the completion of the instructions quiz, participants
were randomly presented with one of the three LARs, either containing all contextual
information, partially redacted contextual information, or no contextual information.
Following the LAR, participants were randomly presented with either the first pair of
footwear impressions or fingerprints, randomly assigned to be either a match or nonmatch. Participants were allowed to refer back to the LAR as many times as needed while
comparing the prints. Once they judged the first pair of prints as a match, non-match, or
inconclusive, they were asked to indicate the confidence in their judgment. Next,
participants were randomly presented with one of the other three remaining pieces of
evidence (a total of two fingerprints and two footwear impressions).
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After analyzing the two pairs of fingerprints (one match and one non-match) and
two pairs of footwear impressions (one match and one non-match), all participants were
presented with the LAR questionnaire. After completion of the LAR questionnaire, all
participants received the non-blind LAR, regardless of the LAR condition they were
originally assigned to. After reading the non-blind LAR, participants were asked if they
would like to change any of their initial decisions. Participants who answered “Yes” to
this question were presented with the four pieces of evidence for a second time along
with a reminder of their prior decision. Every time they changed their initial decision,
they were asked to provide an explanation as to why they decided to change their match,
non-match or inconclusive decision. This was done to mirror proposed linear sequential
unmasking procedures. After participants finished re-analyzing the evidence, they were
provided with the perceptions questionnaire and finished the study by completing the
demographics questionnaire. Participants who answered “No” when asked if they would
like to change any of their initial decisions were instead taken directly to the perceptions
questionnaire. Once participants finished answering the demographics questionnaire, they
were debriefed and thanked for their time.
Coding of Outcome Variables
Time 1 judgements. Time 1 judgements are those participants made prior to
being exposed to the second, complete LAR and are thus comprised of two fingerprint
pair judgements and two footwear impression pair judgements. Fingerprint and footwear
impression judgments were coded as correct, incorrect, or inconclusive. A decision was
scored as correct when a participant judged a pair of matching stimuli as matches (i.e.,
correct identification) or a pair of non-matching stimuli as non-matches (i.e., correct
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exclusion). A decision was scored as incorrect when a participant incorrectly judged a
pair of matching stimuli as non-matches (i.e., incorrect exclusion) or a pair of nonmatching stimuli as matches (i.e., false identification). In line with previous research,
inconclusive decisions were not coded as correct or incorrect (Kerstholt et al., 2010;
Langenburg, Champod, & Wertheim, 2009), but were instead coded separately. Overall
accuracy was also calculated and was defined as the proportion of judgements made
accurately. It was calculated by dividing the total number of correct judgments made
(correct identifications and correct exclusions) by the total number of judgments made.
A signal detection approach was also used to determine how well examiners
discriminated between matching and non-matching pairs of evidence (i.e., discrimination
accuracy) and whether there were differences in examiners’ tendency to respond (i.e.,
response bias). Discrimination accuracy (d՛) was calculated by subtracting the z-score of
false IDs from the z-score of correct IDs. Response bias (c) was calculated by adding the
z-score of correct IDs and the z-score of False IDs, multiplying the outcome by negative
one, and dividing it by two.
Time 2 judgments. Participants were asked whether they would like to reanalyze the evidence after being exposed to the non-blind LAR case summary
information, which contained a complete case summary. For individuals who decided to
change their Time 1 judgments, their Time 2 judgements were coded for the type of
change that was made. A correct change, for example, was one in which the participant
either a) incorrectly judged a matching pair of stimuli as non-matching or inconclusive at
Time 1 and changed their decision to matching or b) incorrectly judged a non-matching
pair of stimuli as matching or inconclusive at Time 1 and changed their decision to non60

matching. An incorrect change, on the other hand, was one in which the participant either
a) correctly judged a pair of matching stimuli as matches at Time 1 and changed their
decision to non-matching or inconclusive or b) correctly judged a pair of non-matching
stimuli as non-matches at Time 1 and changed their decision to matching or inconclusive.
CHAPTER VII
MAIN STUDY RESULTS
Time 1 Judgements
Separate logistic regressions were conducted to examine the effects of contextual
information condition and examiner experience on the likelihood of making a correct
fingerprint ID, correct footwear impression ID, incorrect fingerprint exclusion, incorrect
footwear impression exclusion, correct fingerprint exclusion, correct footwear impression
exclusion, false fingerprint ID, and false footwear impression ID at Time 1. In addition, a
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the effect of contextual
information condition, examiner experience, stimulus material, and stimulus pair on the
number of inconclusive judgments made at Time 1. Contextual information was dummy
coded for logistic regression analyses. First, the blind LAR was selected as the reference
group in order to obtain the following comparisons: blind LAR versus non-blind LAR
and blind LAR versus partially redacted LAR. Next, the partially redacted LAR was
selected as the reference group in order to obtain the last comparison between partially
redacted LAR and non-blind LAR.
Correct fingerprint ID. A logistic regression was conducted to examine the
effect of contextual information condition and examiner experience on the likelihood of
making a correct fingerprint ID (see Table 1). There was a significant effect of
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experience, B = 2.50, Wald = 16.93, p < .001, OR = 12.15, 95% CI for OR = 3.70 to
39.90. Experts were more than 12 times more likely to make a correct fingerprint ID than
novice examiners (see Table 2). However, there was no significant effect of contextual
information on the likelihood of making a correct fingerprint ID such that those who
received the blind LAR did not significantly differ from those who received the non-blind
LAR or from examiners who received a redacted LAR. In addition, participants who
received the non-blind LAR did not significantly differ from those who received the
redacted LAR. There was also no significant interaction between experience and
contextual information.
Correct footwear impression ID. A logistic regression was conducted to
examine the effect of contextual information and examiner experience on the likelihood
of making a correct footwear impression ID (see Table 3). There was a significant effect
of experience, B = -1.88, Wald = 19.51, p < .001, OR = 0.15, 95% CI for OR = 0.07 to
0.35 such that, interestingly, novices were approximately 7 times more likely to make a
correct footwear impression ID than expert examiners (see Table 2). There was no
significant effect of contextual information on the likelihood of making a correct
footwear impression ID such that the different LAR conditions did not significantly differ
from one another. There was also no significant interaction between experience and
contextual information.
Incorrect fingerprint exclusion. A logistic regression was conducted to examine
the effect of contextual information and examiner experience on the likelihood of making
an incorrect fingerprint exclusion (see Table 4). There was a significant effect of
experience, B = -2.82, Wald = 7.65, p = .006, OR = 0.06, 95% CI for OR = 0.01 to 0.44.
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Novices were approximately 17 times more likely than expert examiners to make an
incorrect fingerprint exclusion (see Table 2). Again, there was no significant effect of
contextual information such that regardless of the LAR the examiners received, there
were no differences in their likelihood of making an incorrect fingerprint exclusion.
There was also no significant interaction between experience and contextual information.
Incorrect footwear impression exclusion. A logistic regression was conducted
to examine the effects of contextual information and examiner experience on the
likelihood of making an incorrect footwear impression exclusion (see Table 5). There
was no significant effect of experience meaning experts and novices were equally likely
to make an incorrect footwear impression exclusion. There was also no significant effect
of contextual information such that examiners in the different LAR conditions did not
significantly differ from one another. There was also no significant interaction between
experience and contextual information.
Correct fingerprint exclusion. A logistic regression was conducted to examine
the effect of contextual information and examiner experience on the likelihood of making
a correct fingerprint exclusion (see Table 6). There was a significant effect of experience,
B = 2.65, Wald = 19.17, p < .001, OR = 14.19, 95% CI for OR = 4.33 to 46.55 such that
expert examiners were approximately 14 times more likely to make a correct fingerprint
exclusion than novice examiners (see Table 2). There was no significant effect of
contextual information on the likelihood of making a correct fingerprint exclusion such
that examiners in the different LAR conditions did not significantly differ from one
another. There was also no significant interaction between experience and contextual
information.
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Correct footwear impression exclusion. A logistic regression was conducted to
examine the effect of contextual information and examiner experience on the likelihood
of making a correct footwear impression exclusion (see Table 7). There was no
significant effect of experience or of contextual information. Specifically, experts did not
differ from novices and those who received the blind LAR did not significantly differ
from those who received the non-blind LAR or from the redacted LAR. Those who
received the non-blind LAR also did not significantly differ from those who received the
redacted LAR. However, there was a significant interaction between experience and
contextual information, B = -0.78, Wald = 4.12, p = .043, OR = 0.46, 95% CI for OR =
0.22 to 0.98. Follow up analyses found that only for expert examiners, did receiving a
blind LAR result in a marginally significant increase in the likelihood of making a correct
footwear impression exclusion, B = 1.31, Wald = 3.67, p = .056, OR = 3.71, 95% CI for
OR = 0.97 to 14.23. Specifically, experts who were presented with a blind LAR were
3.71 times more likely to make a correct footwear impression exclusion than experts who
were presented with a redacted LAR. However, this finding should be interpreted with
extreme caution, as it may be a type 1 error.
False fingerprint ID. A logistic regression was conducted to examine the effects
of contextual information and examiner experience on the likelihood of making a false
fingerprint ID (see Table 8). There was no significant effect of experience or of
contextual information on the likelihood of making a false fingerprint ID. That is, experts
and novices did not differ from one another and examiners in the different LAR
conditions also did not significantly differ from one another. There was also no
significant interaction between experience and contextual information.
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False footwear impression ID. A logistic regression was conducted to examine
the effect of contextual information and examiner experience on the likelihood of making
a false footwear impression ID (see Table 9). There was a significant effect of
experience, B = -2.87, Wald = 7.92, p = .005, OR = 0.06, 95% CI for OR = 0.01 to 0.42.
Novice examiners were approximately 17 times more likely to make a false footwear
impression ID than expert examiners (see Table 2). However, there was no significant
effect of contextual information on the likelihood of making a false footwear impression
ID. There was also no significant interaction between experience and contextual
information.
Inconclusive judgments. Regardless of the stimulus material individuals judged
(i.e., fingerprints or footwear impressions) or whether each pair was a match or nonmatch, participants’ were able to make an “inconclusive” judgement. Thus, a participant
could have made a total of one, two, three or four inconclusive judgments. A mixed
ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of contextual information, examiner
experience, stimulus material, and stimulus pair on the total number of inconclusive
judgments made (see Table 10).
There was a significant effect of stimulus material, F(1, 336) = 9.50, p = .002, 𝜂𝑝2
= .027. Examiners made more inconclusive judgments when judging footwear
impressions (M = 0.50, SE = 0.04) than when judging fingerprints (M = 0.33, SE = 0.04).
However, this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between examiner
experience and stimulus material, F(1, 336) = 60.71, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .153, for the number
of inconclusive decisions made. Follow up independent sample t-tests revealed that
experience had a different effect on the number of inconclusive decisions made
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depending on whether the evidence analyzed was a fingerprint or a footwear impression
(see Figure 3). Specifically, experts made significantly more inconclusive decisions (M =
0.71, SD = 0.63) than novices (M = 0.30, SD = 0.49) when judging footwear impression
evidence, t(67.04) = -4.57, p < .001, d = 0.73, 95% CI (-0.59, -0.23), but experts made
significantly fewer inconclusive decisions (M = 0.09, SD = 0.29) than novice examiners
(M = 0.56, SD = 0.63) when judging fingerprint evidence, t(168.57) = 8.79, p < .001, d =
0.96, 95% CI (0.37, 0.58).
There was also a significant effect of stimulus pair, F(1, 336) = 48.72, p < .001,
𝜂𝑝2 = .127, such that participants made more inconclusive decisions when judging nonmatching pairs of stimuli (M = 0.61, SE = 0.05) than when judging matching pairs of
evidence (M = 0.22, SE = 0.03). There was a significant interaction between stimulus pair
and contextual information, F(1, 336) = 3.93, p = .048, 𝜂𝑝2 = .012. However this two-way
interaction was qualified by a three-way interaction between examiner experience,
contextual information, and stimulus pair on the number of inconclusive judgements
made, F(1, 336) = 4.02, p = .019, 𝜂𝑝2 = .023. Follow-up independent sample t-tests
revealed that only when examiners were provided with a Blind LAR, did novice
examiners make marginally significantly more inconclusive judgements (M = 0.74, SD =
0.74) compared to expert examiners (M = 0.37, SD = 0.50), t(107) = 1.92, p = .056, d =
0.59, 95% CI (-0.01, 0.75) when judging non-matching pairs of evidence. There were no
other significant interactions.
Accuracy rate. A mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of
contextual information, examiner experience, stimulus material, and stimulus pair on
examiners’ accuracy rate (see Table 11). As mentioned above, accuracy rate was
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calculated by dividing the total number of correct decisions made, by the number of
decisions made in total. There was a significant main effect of examiner experience, F(1,
336) = 20.82, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .058, such that expert examiners were significantly more
accurate (M = 0.79, SE = 0.03) than novice examiners (M = 0.64, SE = 0.01). However,
this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between examiner experience
and stimulus material, F(1, 336) = 48.20, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = 0.125 (see Figure 4). Follow up
independent sample t-tests revealed that examiner experience only had a significant effect
on fingerprint accuracy rates, t(182.88) = -12.44, p < .001, d = 1.36, 95% CI (-0.43, 0.31) and not on footwear impression accuracy rates. Specifically, experts were
significantly more accurate (M = 0.95, SD = 0.16) when judging fingerprint pairs than
novice examiners (M = 0.57, SD = 0.36). There was also a significant effect of stimulus
pair, F(1, 336) = 35.28, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .095. Both expert and novice examiners were
significantly more accurate when judging matching pairs of stimuli (M = 0.81, SE = 0.02)
than when judging non-matching pairs of stimuli (M = 0.62, SE = 0.03). There were no
other significant main effects or interactions.
Signal Detection Measures
Discrimination accuracy. A mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine the
effects of contextual information, examiner experience, and stimulus material on d՛ (i.e.,
discrimination accuracy) (see Table 12). A discrimination accuracy d՛ value may range
from +∞ to -∞. A score of zero indicates an inability to distinguish between matches and
non-matches, whereas larger values indicate a greater ability to distinguish matches from
non-matches.
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There was a significant main effect of examiner experience, F(1, 335) = 8.14, p =
.005, 𝜂𝑝2 = .024, such that experts were better able to discriminate between matching and
non-matching pairs of stimuli (M = 0.34, SE = 0.13) compared to novices (M = -0.06, SE
= 0.06). There was also a significant main effect of evidence material, F(1, 335) = 7.59, p
= .006, 𝜂𝑝2 = .022. Both expert and novice examiners were better able to discriminate
between matching and non-matching fingerprints (M = 0.34, SE = 0.11) than matching
and non-matching footwear impressions (M = -0.07, SE = 0.10). There was also a
significant interaction between experience and stimulus material, F(1, 335) = 16.18, p <
.001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .046. Follow up independent t-tests revealed that experience only had a
significant effect on fingerprint (and not footwear impression evidence) discrimination
accuracy, t(261.74) = -9.04, d = 0.89, p < .001, 95% CI (-1.22, -0.78) such that experts
were better able to discriminate between matching and non-matching fingerprints (M =
0.84, SD = 0.48) compared to novices (M = -0.16, SD = 1.51; see Figure 5). There were
no other significant main effects or interactions.
Response bias. A mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of
contextual information, examiner experience, and stimulus material on c (i.e., response
bias) (see Table 13). Negative values of c signify a bias towards responding “match”,
whereas positive values signify a bias towards the “non-match” response. The neutral
point of c is 0, which indicates a neutral judgment tendency such that there is no greater
tendency to respond with a match or non-match response.
There was a significant main effect of examiner experience, F(1, 335) = 7.30, p =
.007, 𝜂𝑝2 = .021. Expert examiners were more likely to make a non-match decision
regardless of whether the prints were matches or non-matches (M = 0.18, SE = 0.07)
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compared to novices (M = -0.03, SE = 0.03). There was also a significant main effect of
evidence material, F(1, 335) = 19.55, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .055. Examiners were more likely to
make a non-match decision when judging footwear impressions (M = 0.23, SE = 0.05)
compared to when judging fingerprints (M = -0.08, SE = 0.05). There was also a
significant interaction between examiner experience and stimulus material, F(1, 335) =
41.50, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .110. Follow up independent t-tests revealed that examiner
experience had a significant effect on response bias when judging fingerprint evidence,
t(257.65) = 4.32, p < .001, d = 0.42, 95% CI (0.13, 0.34) such that experts appeared to
have a “match” bias when judging fingerprints (M = -0.19, SD = 0.24) whereas novices
demonstrated more of a “non-match” bias (M = 0.04, SD = 0.74). However, opposite
findings were found when judging footwear impression evidence, t(68.86) = -5.63, p <
.001, d = 0.87, 95% CI (-0.87, -0.42), such that experts tended to have a “non-match” bias
(M = 0.54, SD = 0.79) whereas novices showed more of a “match” bias (M = -0.10, SD =
0.68). There were no other significant main effects or interactions.
Confidence Ratings
A mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of LAR condition,
examiner experience, stimulus material, and stimulus pair on examiners’ confidence
ratings (see Table 14). There was a significant effect of examiner experience, F(1, 336) =
5.35, p = .021, 𝜂𝑝2 = 0.016, such that experts reported feeling more confident in their
judgements (M = 5.75, SE = 0.13) than novices (M = 5.43, SE = 0.06). There was also a
significant effect of stimulus material, F(1, 336) = 16.15, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .046. Examiners
reported feeling more confident in their fingerprint judgements (M = 5.78, SE = 0.09)
than in their footwear impression judgments (M = 5.40, SE = 0.08). However, these main
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effects were qualified by a significant interaction between examiner experience and
stimulus material, F(1, 336) = 152.05, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = 0.312 (see Figure 6). Specifically,
experts reported feeling significantly more confident (M = 6.53, SD = 0.75) than novices
(M = 5.03, SD = 1.28) when judging fingerprints t(123.39) = -11.81, p < .001, d = 1.43,
95% CI (-1.75, -1.25), but reported feeling significantly less confident (M = 4.96, SD =
1.38) than novices (M = 5.83, SD = 0.97) when judging footwear impression evidence,
t(64.57) = 4.42, p < .001, d = 0.73, 95% CI = 0.47, 1.25).
In addition, there was a significant main effect of stimulus pair, F(1, 336) = 27.17,
p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = 0.075, such that examiners reported feeling more confident when judging
matches (M = 5.80, SE = 0.07) than when judging non-matches (M = 5.38, SE = 0.09).
This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between examiner experience
and stimulus pair, F(1, 336) = 3.96, p = .047, 𝜂𝑝2 = 0.012. Specifically, examiner
experience only had a significant effect on examiners’ confidence ratings when analyzing
non-matching pairs of evidence, t(340) = -2.75, p = .006, d = 0.41, 95% CI (-0.40, -0.07),
such that expert examiners felt significantly more confident when judging non-matching
pairs of evidence (M = 5.61, SD = 1.06) than novices (M = 5.14, SD = 1.19). There were
no other significant main effects or interactions.
Finally, bivariate correlations were conducted to examiner the relationship
between individuals’ confidence ratings and their accuracy rate. Analyses revealed a
significant and positive correlation between accuracy rate and confidence, r = .150, p =
.005, such that the more confident individuals felt in their judgments, the more likely they
were to be accurate. Additional exploratory analyses revealed that the positive correlation
between accuracy and confidence was present regardless of the type of stimuli material
70

and stimuli pair examiners analyzed (see Table 15). However, there was only a
significant accuracy-confidence correlation present for participants who viewed the nonblind LAR, r = .246, p = .007, and not for those who were given a blind LAR, r = .088, p
= .364, or a redacted LAR, r = .093, p = .322. In addition, the there was a marginally
positive correlation between accuracy and confidence for novice examiners, r = .114, p =
.053, but not for expert examiners, r = .200, p = .143.
Time 2 Judgments
Decision to review time 1 judgments. A logistic regression was conducted to
examine the effect contextual information and examiner experience had on examiner’s
decision to go back and review their Time 1 judgments after being presented with an
LAR that had all case summary details (see Table 16). There was only a significant effect
of examiner experience, B = -2.18, Wald = 12.95, p < .001, OR = 0.11, 95% CI for OR =
0.03 to 0.37. Novices were more than 9 times more likely than expert examiners to decide
that they wanted to go back to their original responses and make changes. There were no
other significant main effects or interactions. Specifically, only three forensic experts
decided to go back to review their Time 1 judgments, whereas 97 novice examiners
decided to go back to their Time 1 judgments.
Correct and incorrect changes made. Of those participants who decided to go
back to their original responses and make changes (n = 100, 29.2%), a total of 17% made
at least one correct change to their initial response. However, 14% of participants who
decided to go back to their responses after being presented with the non-blind LAR were
incorrect in at least one of the changes they made. The remaining participants (69%),
which included the three expert examiners who decided to review their Time 1
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judgments, did not decide to change any of their initial decisions after being reminded of
their initial judgments.
Incorrect match decisions made. Of particular importance to the current study are
the incorrect changes examiners made when they changed their initial correct non-match
decision or inconclusive decision to an incorrect match decision after being exposed to
new biasing information (i.e., suspects are in custody) as it suggests they were influenced
by such information. Overall, 11% of participants who decided to change their initial
decision made an incorrect match decision after being exposed to additional case
summary details.
Perceptions Questionnaire
Examiners were provided with various questions regarding how well they
performed on the given tasks and their opinions regarding how guilty they found each
suspect to be and whether they felt the initial LAR they received provided them with
enough information to accurately analyze the evidence. In order to better understand how
contextual information and experience can affect such beliefs, separate univariate
ANOVAs were conducted on participants’ self-reported accuracy and each suspect’s guilt
ratings. Furthermore, a logistic regression was conducted on examiners’ belief on
whether or not the initial LAR they received provided them with sufficient information.
Self-reported accuracy. Overall, there was a significant effect of examiner
experience on participants’ self-reported accuracy, F(1, 336) = 60.72, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .153.
Experts reported being more accurate in their judgments (M = 91.12, SE = 2.94) than
novice examiners (M = 66.10, SD = 1.28). However, there was no significant effect of
contextual information, nor was the interaction significant.
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Guilt ratings. A similar pattern of findings was found for examiners’ guilt ratings
for both suspects. Specifically, there was only a significant effect of examiner experience,
such that expert examiners reported lower guilt ratings for suspect #1 (M = 5.32, SE =
0.29) than novices (M = 7.03, SE = 0.13) and for suspect #2 (M = 5.21, SE = 0.27, M =
7.39, SE = 0.16, respectively). This was supported by expert examiners’ comments
regarding their beliefs about the suspects’ guilt. Many expert examiners explicitly stated
it was not their place to determine whether a suspect was guilty or innocent.
Perceptions of information available. There was a significant main effect of
examiner experience on examiners’ belief regarding whether they had sufficient
information on their initial LAR to make accurate decisions about the various pieces of
evidence, B = 2.19, Wald = 16.77, p < .001, OR = 8.97, 95% CI for OR = 3.14 to 25.64.
Experts were approximately nine times more likely to believe they had sufficient
information on their LAR compared to novice examiners. There was also a significant
effect of contextual information, such that those examiners who received the non-blind
LAR were more likely to believe they had sufficient information to make accurate
decisions, compared to examiners who received a blind LAR, B = 0.64, Wald = 4.68, p =
.030, OR = 1.91, 95% CI for OR = 1.06 to 3.41 and also compared to those who received
a partially redacted LAR, B = 0.82, Wald = 7.80, p = .005, OR = 2.27, 95% CI for OR =
1.28 to 4.04. However, there was no significant differences between those who received a
blind LAR and a partially redacted LAR, B = 0.18, Wald = 0.38, p = .537, OR = 1.19,
95% CI for OR = 0.68 to 2.09. There was no significant interaction between examiner
experience and contextual information.
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CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION
The present study was the first to examine the effects of contextual bias,
examiner experience, and stimulus material on examiners’ analyses of forensic evidence.
Specifically, the study examined how differential exposure to case details about a crime
can affect examiners’ analyses of forensic evidence. In doing so, we were able to test the
efficacy of blind testing and linear sequential unmasking methods (i.e., redacting taskirrelevant information), which are two of the most commonly recommended biasreducing procedures (Kassin et al., 2013; Saks et al., 2003). In addition, the effect of
examiner experience and stimulus material on examiners’ analyses were investigated to
address some of the concerns voiced by practitioners regarding the limitations of existing
research, including inexperienced student participants analyzing forensic evidence
samples that require specialized training.
Contextual Information
The first aim of the present study was to examine the effects of contextual bias on
examiners’ evaluation of forensic evidence by varying the amount of pre-comparison
information available to participants while simultaneously testing the efficacy of various
bias-reducing procedures. We hypothesized there would be an effect of contextual
information such that examiners who received a complete, non-blind LAR prior to
conducting analyses and thus had biasing information (e.g., suspects’ criminal history and
custody status) would be more likely to make a match decision (correct and incorrect)
compared to examiners who received the blind or partially redacted LAR. Furthermore, it
was predicted that examiners who received the partially redacted LAR would be more
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likely to make a correct ID and less likely to make a false ID and thus have better
discrimination accuracy than examiners who received the blind LAR. However, results
did not support our hypotheses regarding contextual bias. Instead, findings revealed no
differences between the three contextual information conditions on examiners’ judgments
and thus no differences in their overall accuracy, discrimination accuracy, or response
tendencies. As such, the current findings do not support that recommended blinding and
redaction procedures (Kassin, Dror, Kukucka, 2013) can reduce the broad effect of bias
on examiners’ forensic analyses under the conditions measured, but this may be because
there was no effect of bias found.
Nonetheless, the present findings mirror those found by Kerstholt and colleagues
(2007 & 2010) who also did not find an effect of contextual bias. Kerstholt and
colleagues (2007) included real-world police officers whom had been trained on footwear
impression analyses whereas Kertsholt and colleagues (2010) included forensic firearm
examiners as participants. Specifically, Kerstholt and colleagues’ (2007) found that
providing police officers with additional guilt presumptive contextual information about
suspects in a hypothetical case did not affect their analyses of footwear impression
evidence. Kerstoholt and colleagues’ (2010) also found that providing firearm examiners
with either neutral or biasing information about the number of individuals implicated in
the crime did not affect examiners’ decision regarding whether a set of bullets came from
the same or different firearm. Similarly, present results found that telling real-world
forensic examiners and student participants that the suspects were in custody and
providing them with information about the suspects’ criminal history did not bias their
analyses.
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Differences in contextual bias across studies may be explained by differences in
the types of biasing details available to examiners. Examiners may be affected less by
peripheral information including a suspect’s criminal history or custody status and more
influenced by information that more directly incriminates the suspect. For example, as
previous research has found, telling forensic examiners that the suspect confessed, more
directly associates a particular suspect with the crime being investigated and may thus
more easily affect a forensic examiner’s analyses (Kukucka & Kassin, 2014). In this case,
using a blinding procedure or redaction methods may be useful in decreasing the negative
effect of contextual bias – an important notion for research moving forward.
Another possible explanation why the contextual information, regardless of its
availability and content, did not impact examiners’ judgments of the evidence is that
examiners felt particularly inclined to perform well and treat the analyses as they would
in a real-world case because of the manner in which the information was relayed to them.
Specifically, in the current study examiners were presented with a realistic LAR that
mimicked the form used by the Miami Dade Forensic Services Bureau. Using these
evidence submission forms to manipulate the availability of contextual information
differs from past research, in which examiners are generally provided with a case
summary in the form of a simple paragraph – outside the context of a LAR. Providing
examiners with an official looking document may have led them to assume the role of a
forensic examiner working a real case and thus pay closer attention to study materials and
procedures, decreasing any potential effect of bias when the task-irrelevant information
was available.
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Moreover, it was hypothesized that due to the lack of information, participants in
the blind condition would be less confident in their analyses compared to participants
who received either all the information about the case or a partially redacted LAR.
However, there were no differences in examiners’ confidence ratings depending on the
contextual information condition they were in. This may be because examiners did not
base their confidence ratings on the amount and type of information available to them on
the LAR, but instead on other factors such as their experience with analyzing different
types of forensic evidence. Indeed, the present results found a significant interaction
between examiner experience and stimulus material, such that expert fingerprints
examiners felt significantly more confident in their fingerprint judgments than novices.
Interestingly, novices felt significantly more confident in their footwear impression
judgments compared to experts. This may be because expert examiners recruited for this
study were primarily expert latent fingerprint experts who may have had only a small
amount of experience analyzing footwear impressions and were aware of this differential
experience (unlike student participants who were inexperienced in examining both type
of stimuli). It appears that expert fingerprint examiners adjusted their confidence
judgments accordingly depending on the evidence they were analyzing such that they
were more confident conducting analyses they had more experience with (i.e.,
fingerprints) and less confident when judging evidence they were not too familiar with
(i.e., footwear impressions).
Exploratory analyses also revealed that examiners who received the non-blind
LAR were more likely to believe they had sufficient information to conduct accurate
analyses compared to examiners who received a blind or partially redacted LAR.
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Interestingly, there were no differences in accuracy rates among the various conditions,
which indicates that although examiners may feel they do not have sufficient information
about the case when given blind or partially redacted LARs to perform well, they are still
capable of performing just as well as those who do have all case details.
Examiner Experience
The majority of past research examining the effects of contextual bias on forensic
analyses have used undergraduate, untrained student participants (Dror et al., 2005;
Smalarz et al., 2016). The use of undergraduate students is one of the most common
critiques practitioners in the field have of past research and they often struggle to accept
findings from such studies, stating they cannot be generalized to experts in the field
(Ostrom, 2009). For this reason, the second primary aim of the present study was to
directly compare novice and expert examiners’ vulnerabilities to contextual bias and their
ability to conduct forensic analyses. Overall, it was hypothesized that novices would
make more mistakes than expert examiners (i.e., less likely to make correct IDs and
correct exclusions and more likely to make false IDs and incorrect exclusions) and have
poorer discrimination accuracy because of their lack of experience in analyzing
fingerprint and footwear impression evidence. Findings of the present study supported
this hypothesis such that novices tended to perform worse than expert forensic examiners.
For example, novices were less likely to make correct fingerprint and footwear
impression IDs, more likely to make false footwear impression IDs, and had worse
overall accuracy and discrimination accuracy compared to expert examiners.
Furthermore, an interaction between examiner experience and contextual
information was predicted such that task-irrelevant information was believed to influence
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novice examiners more so than expert examiners. On the basis of past research
suggesting that differences in examiners’ susceptibility to bias can depend on the level of
experience with conducting fingerprint evidence analyses (Langenburg et al., 2009),
examiners with no experience analyzing forensic evidence were expected to rely more on
the contextual information when available (i.e., non-blind LAR condition) compared to
expert examiners. That is, novice examiners would be more influenced than experts by
task-irrelevant information because of the increased unfamiliarity and difficulty of the
task at hand. However, an interaction between examiner experience and contextual
information was not found. This lack of predicted finding may also be explained in line
with earlier discussing of the role of stimulus material in this effect: The type of taskirrelevant and biasing information provided to examiners may not have been sufficiently
biasing to allow examiners to rely on such information when it was available even when
the examiner had no experience in conducting forensic analyses. In the context of realworld forensic examiners’ criticism of prior research however, this lack of interaction
cautiously suggests that using lay examiners may not necessarily overestimate the
potential for cognitive bias per se as student examiners did not showcase a heightened
vulnerability to prior case information compared to expert examiners. However, given
that there was no main effect of prior case information contained in LARs, future
research needs to urgently address potential differences in vulnerability to cognitive bias
in forensic examination between experts and novices when such bias does exist.
Although an interaction between examiner experience and contextual information
was not supported by the present findings, there was a significant interaction between
examiner experience and stimulus material, as predicted. Experts were expected to
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perform significantly better than novices, but only when analyzing fingerprint evidence
because it requires more specialized training than footwear impression evidence. This
hypothesis was supported in that expert examiners performed significantly better than
novice examiners, but only when analyzing fingerprint evidence and not footwear
impression evidence. These findings suggest past research using forensic stimulus
materials that require specialized training and recruiting untrained participant examiners
(e.g., Dror et al., 2005) may be underestimating the accuracy of forensic examiners in the
field and future research should only use undergraduate student samples if the stimulus
material being analyzed has been extensively pilot-tested and does not require on-the-job
specialized training (e.g., footwear impression evidence). In addition, an interaction
between examiner experience and stimulus material on participants’ response bias was
found such that experts were more likely to make a “match” decision when analyzing
fingerprint evidence compared to novices. Interestingly however, expert examiners were
more likely to make a “non-match” decision when analyzing footwear impressions
compared to novices. It appears that differences in fingerprint analyses experience
between our expert and novice participants led to differences in reporting tendencies. It
may be that although footwear impression analyses requires less specialized training than
fingerprint analyses and both are a form of pattern analyses, simply being trained in one
does not make you proficient in the analyses of the other and may in fact hinder your
abilities to analyze other forms of evidence. As such, future work should more finely
examine the similarities and differences between forensic evidence trainings and
investigate how these differences affect examiners’ judgments across a variety of forensic
domains.
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Stimulus Material
The third and final aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of
contextual bias on examiners’ evaluation of fingerprint and footwear impression
evidence, with fingerprint examination requiring significantly more expertise and training
than footwear impression analyses (International Association for Identification, 2018;
Sirchie, 2018). It was hypothesized that contextual bias would have an effect on
examiners’ judgments when the evidence being analyzed required significantly more
specialized training (fingerprints). However, present findings did not support the
interaction between contextual bias and evidence type. Regardless of whether examiners
were provided with a blind, non-blind or partially redacted LAR there were no
differences in examiners’ performance when analyzing fingerprint evidence.
The present findings do not suggest fingerprint evidence analyses are particularly
susceptible to the effects of contextual information compared to analyses of footwear
impression evidence, which is at odds with the general belief that evidence difficulty and
ambiguity moderate the effect of contextual bias (Dror et al., 2005). However, it is
important to note that not all past research has found a moderating effect of evidence
difficulty and ambiguity (with ambiguous materials being more difficult to analyze)
(Kerstholt, et al., 2007). That is, some research has failed to find an effect of contextual
information even with particularly difficult analyses. For example, Kerstholt and
colleagues (2007) did not find an effect of bias on footwear impression analyses even
when the footwear impressions were made to be ambiguous. It was initially hypothesized
that these discrepant results from past research were due to differences in the evidence
material used such that Dror and colleagues (2005) used fingerprints while Kerstholt and
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colleagues (2007) used footwear impressions. Surprisingly, our results did not provide
support for this hypothesis.
We can only speculate as to why contextual information did not have an effect on
neither examiners’ fingerprint nor footwear impression analyses. Contextual information
may not have influenced examiners’ analyses when judging footwear impression
evidence because the footwear impression pairs presented to participants were of
comparable difficulty to the fingerprint pairs. For example, on average, the difficulty
rating of the footwear impression stimuli used for the current study was 2.56, and the
average difficulty for the fingerprint stimuli was 4.06 (rated on a scale from 1 being not
at all difficult to 7 being extremely difficult). It is possible that if fingerprints with a
higher difficulty level (i.e., had been selected from the ‘insufficient to difficult’ category)
and footwear impressions from the ‘moderate to easy’ category had been chosen, an
effect of contextual information would have been found for fingerprints and not footwear
impressions. Nonetheless, discrepancies between current results and existing research
warrant a more precise examination of how evidence type (e.g., evidence complexity,
ambiguity, difficulty) plays a role in the relationship between contextual bias and
examiners’ forensic analyses.
Testing Linear Sequential Unmasking Procedures
Exploratory analyses were also conducted to examine the effect of presenting
participants with a non-blind LAR (regardless of the initial LAR they had received) and
asking them whether they would like to change any of their initial judgments, mirroring
recommended linear sequential unmasking procedures. Although only 100 participants
decided to go back to their original responses, 17% of those who decided to change at
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least one of their Time 1 judgments made a correct change. However, 14% of participants
who decided to go back to their Time 1 judgments made an incorrect change. It appears
that the linear sequential unmasking procedure may result in both increases in correct and
incorrect changes at Time 2. However, only novice examiners actually made changes at
their Time 2 judgments, whereas no expert examiners did, questioning further the actual
usefulness of the proposed procedure and also the usefulness of even providing the taskrelevant information in the first place.
It is important to note however that because the present study is the first to
experimentally examine the linear sequential unmasking procedure, it provided a very
simplified manner in which additional case details were sequentially presented to
examiners. Specifically, examiners who were initially given a blind or partially-redacted
LAR later received all case details that were previously unavailable all at once in the
second LAR and not one detail at a time. It may be that presenting examiners with one
detail at a time, may result in fewer errors. Future research should investigate
systematically how the level of bias and importance in any additional detail affect the
potential for bias.
Limitations and Future Directions
The current study sought to examine differences between experts and novices and
in doing so required study methods to be employed easily to practitioners in the field.
Thus, the study was distributed using Qualtrics survey system, which - similar to past
research in the field - did not allow for the implementation of tools commonly used by
practitioners to analyze forensic fingerprint evidence (e.g., CSIpix and PiAnoS). In order
to address this limitation, only ‘moderate to easy’ difficulty level fingerprint comparisons
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were presented to examiners. Considering fingerprint stimuli chosen for the current study
were rated by experts to be relatively “easy” comparisons – unlike any other prior study the degree to which bias could have impacted examiners’ judgments may have been
reduced. However, undergraduate students rated the same fingerprints as being more
difficult, yet an effect of bias was still not found. Nonetheless, future research should aim
at using more difficult stimuli and allow examiners to use the programs and analysis
software commonly found in the field. Additionally, due to the extreme difficulty in
recruiting expert examiners, the current study may be underpowered as only 55 expert
examiners participated versus 287 novice examiners. Thus, there is the possibility that an
interaction between examiner experience and contextual bias may still be found if
additional expert examiners were to be recruited. Nonetheless, the current study’s sample
is significantly larger than previous studies that have also aimed to recruit experts in the
field (Dror & Charlton, 2006; Dror, Charlton & Peron 2005) and provides a positive
outlook for future research. Future research should continue to engage in collaborative
research processes that involve practitioners in order to build trusting relationships, which
subsequently results in more practitioners agreeing to participate in research.
Another potential limitation of the current study is that examiners were presented
only with an LAR and no other case materials. Forensic examiners are sometimes
provided with additional materials such as witness statements, pathology reports and
other types of contextual information, which were not used in the current study.
Nonetheless, the current study improves upon previous research such that examiners were
presented with an evidence submission form that mirrors those frequently found in the
field and used by forensic labs across the United States (Gardener et al., 2019) instead of
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a case summary in the form of a written paragraph, which is unlikely to mirror actual lab
practices. Future research should continue to expand on the generalizability of materials
used in experimental research by providing examiners with additional case materials that
are commonly provided to forensic examiners.
Furthermore, research examining the effects of contextual bias and testing the
efficacy of proposed procedures used to reduce the effect of bias should move beyond
basic laboratory paradigms and into field settings. Although it is difficult to maintain the
same experimental control found in laboratory studies, it is crucial to test contextual
information management procedures (e.g., context-manager method) with practitioners in
order to properly understand how they can be implemented in a forensic laboratory’s
standard operating procedures without disrupting the existing workflow. In addition,
testing bias-reducing procedures in the field allows researchers and practitioners to
determine what additional resources, if any, are necessary to successfully implement such
procedures. For example, Found and Ganas (2013) tested a contextual information
management procedure in a field setting and were able to determine that no additional
personnel, time, or money was necessary to implement such a procedure for a laboratorybased bloodstain pattern analysis. However, additional field studies, developed in
collaboration with forensic experts must be conducted to discover if these same
promising findings carry over to other forensic domains such as fingerprints, firearms,
and DNA analyses.
Implications and Conclusions
Cognitive bias, specifically contextual bias, has become a primary area of concern
within the forensic sciences due to high profile exoneration cases highlighting the
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detrimental effects that having details about a case can have on a forensic examiner’s
analyses (Innocence Project, 2017; National Academy of Sciences, 2009). Fortunately,
researchers have proposed several solutions to decrease the negative effects of contextual
bias such as the use of blind testing and redacting task-irrelevant information from case
reports, both of which were examined in the current study (Kassin et al., 2013; Mattijssen
et al., 2016). Although an effect of contextual information was not found, present
findings still provide a promising outlook for the use of bias reducing procedures. That is,
examiners often express concern about the use of such bias reducing procedures because
it limits the amount of information they receive, which they believe may hinder their
ability to accurately analyze forensic evidence. However, current results suggest there
were no differences in examiners’ overall accuracy and discrimination accuracy rates
suggesting that regardless of whether an examiner has all case details, no case details, or
only task-relevant case details, an examiner is able to maintain the same level of
accuracy.
The present study also sought to address another common critique made by
forensic examiners in the field regarding past research - having untrained undergraduate
students analyze complex pieces of forensic evidence. By directly comparing expert and
novice examiners’ performance in analyzing two types of forensic evidence that differ in
level of difficulty (i.e., fingerprint and footwear impression evidence), the current study
was able to confirm the importance of using stimuli materials that require less specialized
training when using untrained examiners in research. Expert examiners were found to be
significantly more accurate than novice examiners. However, expert examiners were only
significantly more accurate and better able to discriminate between matching and non86

matching pairs of evidence when analyzing fingerprint evidence and not footwear
impression evidence. Thus, previous research using inexperienced student examiners
must be interpreted with caution; especially when such novice examiners are asked to
analyze evidence that requires a significant amount of training, such as fingerprints.
To summarize, the present work provides promising results for the use of several
bias-reducing methods. In legal proceedings, using blind testing and other contextual
information management procedures, such as redacting task-irrelevant information, allow
forensic expert witnesses to demonstrate to the court that proper steps were taken to
reduce the potential for bias in their analyses. In addition, findings of the current study
provide an important insight as to what occurs when undergraduate students versus
trained forensic examiners are asked to analyze complex pieces of forensic evidence.
Mainly, researchers should take careful consideration and work closely with actual
forensic experts when developing stimulus materials and deciding what type of
participant sample to use when conducting psychological research within forensic science
domains.
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Table 1.
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on
Likelihood of Making a Correct Fingerprint ID

Time 1 Judgment

B

SE

p

Exp
(B)

95% CI for

Exp(B)

Correct Fingerprint ID
Experience

2.50

0.61

.000*

12.15

3.70 - 39.90

Blindr v. partially redacted

-0.38

0.29

.195

0.69

0.39 - 1.21

Blindr v. non-blind

0.02

0.29

.948

1.02

0.57 - 1.81

Partially redactedr v. non-blind

0.40

0.27

.166

1.49

0.85 - 2.60

Contextual information x experience

0.29

0.74

.693

1.34

0.32 - 5.67

Note. r = reference group.
* = significant.
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Table 2.
Time 1 Judgments by Examiner Experience.
Time 1
Judgments

Examiner
Experience

Frequency

Percentage

M (SD)

Fingerprint
Correct ID

Expert

52

94.5%

0.95 (0.23)

Novice

170

59.2%

0.59 (0.49)

Footwear
Expert
Impression Correct
ID
Novice

42

76.4%

0.76 (0.43)

274

95.5%

0.95 (0.21)

Expert

1

1.8%

0.02 (0.13)

Novice

68

23.7%

0.23 (0.43)

Incorrect Footwear Expert
Impression
Exclusion
Novice

1

1.8%

0.02 (0.13)

9

3.1%

0.03 (0.17)

Incorrect
Fingerprint
Exclusion

Correct
Fingerprint
Exclusion

Expert

52

94.5%

0.95 (0.23)

Novice

158

55.1%

0.55 (0.50)

Correct Footwear
Impression
Exclusion

Expert

27

49.1%

0.49 (0.50)

Novice

135

47%

0.47 (0.50)

False Fingerprint
ID

Expert

0

0%

0.00 (0.00)

Novice

16

5.6%

0.06 (0.23)

Expert

1

1.8%

0.02 (0.13)

Novice

70

24.4%

0.24 (0.43)

False Footwear
Impression
Exclusion
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Table 3.
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on
Likelihood of Making a Correct Footwear Impression ID

Time 1 Judgment

B

SE

p

Exp
(B)

95% CI for

Exp(B)

Correct Footwear Impression ID
Experience

-1.89

0.43

.000*

0.15

0.07 - 0.35

Blindr v. partially redacted

0.40

0.54

.459

1.49

0.52 - 4.32

Blindr v. non-blind

0.04

0.50

.933

1.04

0.39 - 2.78

Partially redactedr v. non-blind

-0.36

0.53

.498

0.70

0.25 - 1.97

Contextual information x experience

0.74

0.56

.187

2.10

0.70 - 6.31

Note. r = reference group.
* = significant.
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Table 4.
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on
Likelihood of Making an Incorrect Fingerprint Exclusion

Time 1 Judgment

B

SE

p

Exp
(B)

95% CI for

Exp(B)

Incorrect Fingerprint Exclusion
Experience

-2.82

1.02

.006*

0.06

0.01 - 0.44

Blindr v. partially redacted

0.03

0.34

.940

1.03

0.53 - 1.98

Blindr v. non-blind

-0.14

0.34

.677

0.87

0.45 - 1.69

Partially redactedr v. non-blind

-0.17

0.34

.620

0.85

0.44 - 1.64

Contextual information x experience

-0.10

1.25

.935

0.90

0.08 - 10.37

Note. r = reference group.
* = significant.
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Table 5.
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on
Likelihood of Making an Incorrect Footwear Impression Exclusion

Time 1 Judgment

B

SE

p

Exp
(B)

95% CI for

Exp(B)

Incorrect Footwear Impression
Exclusion
Experience

-0.56

1.07

.598

0.57

0.07 - 4.61

Blindr v. partially redacted

0.49

0.74

.508

1.64

0.38 - 7.03

Blindr v. non-blind

-0.50

0.92

.592

0.61

0.10 - 3.72

Partially redactedr v. non-blind

-0.99

0.85

.244

0.37

0.07 - 1.96

Contextual information x experience

1.38

0.03

.997

0.90

0.00 - 0.01

Note. r = reference group.
* = significant.
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Table 6.
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on
Likelihood of Making a Correct Fingerprint Exclusion

Time 1 Judgment

B

SE

p

Exp
(B)

95% CI for

Exp(B)

Correct Fingerprint Exclusion
Experience

2.65

0.61

.000*

14.19

4.33 - 46.55

Blindr v. partially redacted

0.29

0.29

.311

1.34

0.76 - 2.37

Blindr v. non-blind

-0.29

0.29

.308

0.75

0.43 - 1.31

Partially redactedr v. non-blind

-0.99

0.85

.244

0.37

0.07 - 1.96

Contextual information x experience

-0.06

0.78

.940

0.94

0.21 - 4.33

Note. r = reference group.
* = significant.
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Table 7.
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on
Likelihood of Making a Correct Footwear Impression Exclusion

Time 1 Judgment

B

SE

p

Exp
(B)

95% CI for

Exp(B)

Correct Footwear Impression
Exclusion
Experience

0.08

0.30

.778

1.09

0.61 - 1.94

Blindr v. partially redacted

0.02

0.27

.941

1.02

0.60 - 1.73

Blindr v. non-blind

-0.06

0.27

.817

0.94

0.56 - 1.58

Partially redactedr v. non-blind

-0.08

0.26

.756

0.92

0.55 - 1.54

Contextual information x experience

-0.78

0.39

.043*

0.46

0.22 - 0.98

Note. r = reference group.
* = significant.
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Table 8.
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on
Likelihood of Making a False Fingerprint ID

Time 1 Judgment

B

SE

p

Exp
(B)

95% CI for

Exp(B)

False Fingerprint ID
Experience

18.36

5377.50

.997

0.00

0.00 - --

Blindr v. partially redacted

-0.75

0.72

.300

0.47

0.12 - 1.95

Blindr v. non-blind

0.10

0.03

.865

1.10

0.36 - 3.41

Partially redactedr v. non-blind

0.85

0.71

.230

2.33

0.59 - 9.30

Contextual information x experience

0.39

7496.57

1.00

1.48

0.00 - --

Note. r = reference group.
* = significant.
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Table 9.
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on
Likelihood of Making a False Footwear Impression ID

Time 1 Judgment

B

SE

p

Exp
(B)

95% CI for

Exp(B)

False Footwear Impression ID
Experience

-2.87

1.02

.005*

0.06

0.01 - 0.42

Blindr v. partially redacted

0.03

0.35

.931

1.03

0.53 - 2.03

Blindr v. non-blind

0.30

0.33

.373

1.35

0.70 - 2.58

Partially redactedr v. non-blind

0.27

0.33

.418

1.31

0.69 - 2.48

Contextual information x experience

-0.10

1.35

.938

0.90

0.06 - 12.64

Note. r = reference group.
* = significant.
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Table 10.
Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on Total Number of
Inconclusive Judgments Made

Predictor

M

SE

Contextual Information
Blind

0.41

0.06

Non-blind

0.43

0.05

Partially redacted

0.41

0.05

Examiner Experience
Expert

0.40

0.05

Novice

0.43

0.02

Stimulus Material
Fingerprints

0.33

0.04

Footwear impressions

0.50

0.04

Stimulus Pair
0.22

0.03

0.61

0.05

Match
Non-match
Note. * = significant.
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F

p

𝜂𝑝2

0.03

.973

.000

0.33

.569

.001

9.50

.002*

.027

48.73

.000*

.127

Table 11.
Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on Accuracy Rate

Predictor

M

SE

Contextual Information
Blind

0.73

0.03

Non-blind

0.70

0.03

Partially redacted

0.72

0.03

Examiner Experience
Expert

0.79

0.03

Novice

0.64

0.01

Stimulus Material
Fingerprints

0.76

0.03

Footwear impressions

0.67

0.02

Stimulus Pair
Match

0.81

0.02

Non-match

0.61

0.03

Note. * = significant.
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F

p

𝜂𝑝2

0.16

.856

.001

20.82

.000*

.058

6.94

.009*

.020

35.28

.000*

.095

Table 12.
Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on Discrimination
Accuracy

Predictor

M

SE

Contextual Information
Blind

0.10

0.13

Non-blind

0.04

0.12

Partially redacted

0.28

0.12

Examiner Experience
Expert

0.34

0.06

Novice

-0.06

0.13

Stimulus Material
Fingerprints

0.34

0.11

Footwear impressions

-0.67

0.10

Note. * = significant.
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F

p

𝜂𝑝2

1.07

.344

.006

8.14

.005*

.024

7.59

.006*

.022

Table 13.
Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on Response Bias

Predictor

M

SE

Contextual Information
Blind

0.10

0.07

Non-blind

0.07

0.07

Partially redacted

0.05

0.07

Examiner Experience
Expert

0.18

0.07

Novice

-0.03

0.03

Stimulus Material
Fingerprints

-0.08

0.05

Footwear impressions

0.23

0.05

Note. * = significant.

100

F

p

𝜂𝑝2

0.16

.855

.001

7.30

.007*

.021

19.55

.000*

.055

Table 14.
Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on Confidence Ratings

Predictor

M

SE

Contextual Information
Blind

5.64

0.13

Non-blind

5.65

0.11

Partially redacted

5.47

0.12

Examiner Experience
Expert

5.75

0.13

Novice

5.43

0.06

Stimulus Material
Fingerprints

5.78

0.09

Footwear impressions

5.40

0.08

Stimulus Pair
Match

2.90

0.04

Non-match

2.69

0.04

Note. * = significant.
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F

p

𝜂𝑝2

0.76

.469

.005

5.35

.021*

.016

16.15

.000*

.046

27.17

.000*

.075

Table 15.
Confidence and Accuracy Bivariate Correlation by Predictor Variables

Condition

r

p

Blind LAR

.088

.364

Non-blind LAR

.246

.007*

Redacted LAR

.093

.322

Experts

.200

.143

Novices

.114

.053

Fingerprint

.214

.000*

Footwear impression

.210

.000*

.200

.000*

.219

.000*

Contextual Information

Examiner Experience

Stimulus Material

Stimulus Pair
Match
Non-match
Note. * = significant.
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Table 16.
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Contextual Information and
Examiner Experience on Likelihood of Reviewing Time 1 Judgments

Time 1 Judgment

B

SE

p

Exp
(B)

95% CI for

Exp(B)

Correct Fingerprint ID
Experience

2.50

0.61

.000*

12.15

3.70 - 39.90

Blindr v. partially redacted

-0.38

0.29

.195

0.69

0.39 - 1.21

Blindr v. non-blind

0.02

0.29

.948

1.02

0.57 - 1.81

Partially redactedr v. non-blind

0.40

0.27

.166

1.49

0.85 - 2.60

Contextual information x experience

0.29

0.74

.693

1.34

0.32 - 5.67

Note. r = reference group.
* = significant.
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Figure 1. Student Match Fingerprint Judgements
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Figure 2. Student Non-Match Fingerprint Judgements
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Figure 3. Average Number of Inconclusive Judgments by Examiner Experience and
Stimulus Material.
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Figure 4. Average Accuracy Rate by Examiner Experience and Evidence Material
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Figure 5. Average Discrimination Accuracy by Examiner Experience and Evidence
Material
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Figure 6. Average Confidence Ratings by Examiner Experience and Evidence Material
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Appendix A
Miami-Dade Police Department Lab Analysis Request Form
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Appendix B
Blind Condition Lab Analysis Request Form
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Appendix C
Non-Blind Condition Lab Analysis Request Form
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Appendix D
Partially Redacted Condition Lab Analysis Request Form
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Appendix E
Critical Pieces of Information on Non-Blind and Partially Redacted Condition Lab
Analysis Request Forms
1.

Two subjects forced entry to car
a. Needs to be known for collection and examination purposes. Examiners
need to know that more than one subject entered the car because if they
are not given this information, then they may believe that they can stop
analyzing the evidence after they analyze the first pair of prints. If there is
more than one subject, then examiners are aware that more evidence needs
to be analyzed and tested.

2.

A lighter was found
a. Needs to be known for examination purposes. Examiners need to know
that a lighter was found at the crime scene and thus needs to be analyzed
for prints and DNA.

3.

Latent lifts were collected from inside of car
a. Needs to be known for examination and database entry purposes.
Examiners need to know where the fingerprints were lifted from. If they
were collected from inside the care, then the examiner knowns that it can
be either from the victim, either one of the subjects who entered the car, or
any other person who has been inside the vehicle. Also, in order for the
evidence to be entered into certain databases (e.g., AFIS) items must be
directly associated to the crime and so knowing that the prints were lifted
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form inside of the car and the subjects forced entry into the car, then the
prints become associated with the crime.
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Appendix F
Lab Analysis Request Form Questionnaire
Please answer the following open-ended and multiple-choice questions regarding the lab
analysis request form you were given.
1. Please write down everything you remember about the information provided in
the lab request form.
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
2. What type of case summary did you receive as part of the Lab Analysis Request
Form?
a. Complete case summary
b. Partially redacted (i.e., blacked-out) case summary
c. No case summary (routine)
3. How many fingerprint pairs were you asked to analyze?
a. 1 pair of fingerprints
b. 2 pairs of fingerprints
c. 3 pairs of fingerprints
d. I don’t know
4. How many footwear impression pairs were you asked to analyze?
a. 1 pair of footwear impressions
b. 2 pairs of footwear impressions
c. 3 pairs of footwear impressions
d. I don’t know
5. What type of crime occurred?
a. Attempted murder
b. Attempted strong armed robbery
c. Carjacking
d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
6. How many suspects were involved?
a. 1 suspect
b. 2 suspects
c. 3 suspects
123

d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
7. How many victims were involved?
a. 1 victim
b. 2 victims
c. 3 victims
d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
8. What evidence was submitted to the crime lab?
a. A gun
b. A lighter
c. A hat
d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
9. Where were fingerprints lifted from the car?
a. Steering wheel
b. Passenger door window
c. Trunk of the car
d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
10. Where was the victim coming from?
a. She was leaving work
b. She was leaving school
c. She was leaving a concert
d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
11. Where did the crime take place?
a. At a hotel parking lot
b. Near a supermarket
c. On a school campus
d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
12. What did the suspects demand from the victim?
a. Her purse and jewelry
b. Her cellphone
c. Nothing
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d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
13. What weapon was used?
a. A gun
b. A knife
c. There was no weapon
d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
14. What item was taken from the victim?
a. A cellphone
b. A purse
c. Nothing
d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
15. Who dropped an item?
a. Subject #1
b. Subject #2
c. The victim
d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
16. Where was the car parked?
a. In a parking garage
b. On a dirt lot
c. At a meter
d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
17. How many suspects were in custody?
a. None
b. Only one
c. Both
d. Information not given
e. I don’t know
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Appendix G
Perceptions Questionnaire
1. Across all judgments you made, how accurate do you think you were?
0% (not at all accurate) – 100% (extremely accurate)
2. How guilty do you think suspect #1, Erick Rodriguez is?
1 (definitely innocent) – 10 (definitely guilty)
3. How guilty do you think suspect #2, Michael English is?
1 (definitely innocent) – 10 (definitely guilty)
For participants in non-blind condition:
1. Do you feel that sufficient information was provided in the lab analysis request
forms to make accurate judgements?
a. Yes
b. No
If not, why? ____________
2. Do you feel that your analyses were biased because you had information about the
case?
c. Yes
d. No
3. Which type of lab request form would you prefer to have when analyzing forensic
evidence?
e. A lab analysis request form with all the possible case information
f. A lab analysis request form with all irrelevant case information redacted
g. A lab analysis request form with no case information
For participants in partially redacted condition:
1. Did you feel that sufficient information was provided in the first lab analysis
request form to make accurate decisions about the forensic evidence?
h. Yes
i. No
If not, why? ____________
2. Did you feel more comfortable in your decision after receiving all the information
about the case in your second lab request form?
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j. Yes
k. No
3. Do you feel that you may have been unduly influenced if provided with the
redacted information (blacked-out) in your first lab request form?
l. Yes
m. No
4. Which type of lab request form would you prefer to have when analyzing forensic
evidence?
n. A lab analysis request form with all possible case information
o. A lab analysis request form with all irrelevant case information redacted
p. A lab analysis request form with no case information
For those who had a case summary with no information:
1. Did you feel that sufficient information was provided in the first lab analysis
request form to make accurate decisions about the forensic evidence?
a. Yes
b. No
If not, why? ____________
2. Did you feel more comfortable in your decision after receiving all the information
about the case in your second lab request form?
a. Yes
b. No
3. What was your interpretation of the word “Routine” found in the first lab request
form?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
4. Do you feel that you may have been unduly influenced if provided with case
information in your first lab request form?
a. Yes
b. No
5. Which type of lab request form would you prefer to have when analyzing forensic
evidence?
a. A lab analysis request form with all possible case information
b. A lab analysis request form with irrelevant case information redacted
c. A lab analysis request form with no case information
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Appendix H
Demographics Questionnaire
1. What is your age? _______
2. What is your gender?
a. Male
b. Female
3. What is your ethnicity
a. Caucasian
b. Hispanic or Latino
c. Black or African American
d. Asian or Pacific Islander
e. Native American or American Indian
f. Other (Please Specify: _______________)
4. What is your highest level of education?
a. High school degree
b. Associates Degree
c. Bachelors’ Degree
d. Master’s Degree
e. Doctoral Degree
f. Other (Please Specify: _______________)
5. What is your occupation? _______________
6. Have you had any experience analyzing forensic evidence?
a. No
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b. Yes
i. If yes, please briefly explain your experience below:
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
7. Please select one of the following:
a. I am an undergraduate student at FIU
b. I am a trained forensic examiner (or have experience analyzing forensic
evidence)
The following questions will be asked only to expert forensic examiners.
8. How many years of active casework experience have you completed?
_______________
9. Are you employed by a law enforcement agency?
a. No
i. If no, please explain
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
b. Yes
i. If yes, what type of Law Enforcement Agency are you employed
by?
1. Local
2. State
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3. Federal
10. Are latent print examinations your primary duty?
a. Yes
b. No
11. Do you examine other types of evidence in addition to latent fingerprints?
a. No
b. Yes (If yes, please specify: _______________________________)
12. Are you an IAI certified latent print examiner?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Does not apply
13. Do you usually apply ACE-V methodology in latent print examinations?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Does not apply
14. Have you completed any structured latent fingerprint training program?
a. Yes
i. If yes, how long was the training program?
1. 0 to 1 years
2. 1 to 2 years
3. More than 2 years
ii. If yes, how long ago did you complete this training?
1. Less than a year ago
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2. Between 1 to 2 years ago
3. More than 2 years ago
iii. If yes, please describe the type of structured fingerprint training
you have completed.
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
____
b. No
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